Inter-World Probability and the Problem of Induction

Abstract

Laurence BonJour has recently proposed a novel and interesting approach to the problem of induction. He grants that it is contingent, and so not a priori , that our patterns of inductive inference are reliable. Nevertheless, he claims, it is necessary and a priori that those patterns are highly likely to be reliable, and that is enough to ground an a priori justification induction. This paper examines an important defect in BonJour's proposal. Once we make sense of the claim that inductive inference is "necessarily highly likely" to be reliable, we find that it is not knowable a priori after all.

BonJour’s Abductivist Reply to Skepticism

“…7 Cf. Beebe (forthcoming b) andWrenn (2006) for further discussion of the problems and prospects of modal frequentism.10 One difficulty BonJour must overcome is that -at least according toFumerton (1995, 201) -a Keynesian conception of probability "loses that necessary connection between epistemic rationality and truth." This alleged fact clashes sharply with BonJour's deep-seated beliefs about the relation between justification and truth.…”

The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism

“…32 32 Cf. Beebe (2008) and Wrenn (2006) for further discussion of the problems facing modal frequentism. …”

Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction?

“…5 5 Cf. Wrenn (2006) for a series of well‐aimed attacks on BonJour's claims about the relative frequencies of normal and counter‐inductive worlds using what Reichenbach (1949, §40) calls a ‘geometric interpretation’ of frequentist probability. …”