Inter-agency work and the UK public sector investigation of fraud, 1996–2006: joined-up rhetoric and disjointed reality

Abstract

Most policing activity in the area of UK public sector fraud is undertaken not by the police but by departmental investigators. This article explores the shifting rhetoric and on-the-ground efforts to escape departmental silos in order to address 'the problem of fraud' and fraudsters more efficiently and effectively via 'joined up working'. These public sector reforms have been promoted principally by the National Audit Office and government. It reveals that these efforts have generally been modest in practice, because they have gone against the grain of departmental objectives and cultures. In the context of these experiences, the prospects for change in publicÁpublic and publicÁprivate partnerships are explored in the light of the UK government Fraud Review and the National Fraud Strategic Authority.

Fraud investigation and the ‘flawed architecture’ of counter fraud entities in the United Kingdom

“…For example the police are required to utilise their powers of arrest and search when suspects will not co-operate, or ultimately to take the case forward for prosecution. The Fraud Review Team (2006) discovered evidence of variable police interest in pursuing investigations with fraud which has been well documented elsewhere (Levi, 1987;Doig et al, 2001;and Levi, 2003;Doig and Levi, 2009). In this research mixed evidence was discovered of examples of both good and bad practice.…”

“…Bodies such as the police fraud squads, SFO, SOCA, FSA, NFA could merge to create a national fraud agency with both a preventative and investigative capacity. There is already an emerging debate on this issue (see Button et al, 2008;Doig and Levi, 2009;Fisher, 2010). Another model might be for a much stronger network of investigators linked by common accreditations and co-ordinated and over seen by the NFA, similar to what was created in the NHS with Trusts.…”

“…Some are good, some are average and some are poor. Many frauds require joint actions and partnerships, which are often difficult to create (Fraud Review Team, 2006;Doig and Levi, 2009). Moreover the architecture shows differences in funding and capacity, with many entities lacking appropriate resources and being prone to cuts.…”

“…There has been only limited interest in examining in greater depth some of these many entities, and particularly those focused upon fraud (Gill and Hart, 1997;Jones and Newburn, 1998;Button, 2002;Prenzler, 2006;Doig and Levi, 2009;Smith et al, 2010). This paper will seek to begin to fill this gap by mapping the different entities engaged in countering fraud and providing an analytical framework for assessing their foundations.…”

Detecting Accounting Anomalies Using Benford’s Law: Evidence From the Malaysian Public Sector

“…Fraud in the public sector has not gained much attention from academics and policy-makers as opposed to other types of crimes (Doig & Levi, 2009). The ACFE (2012) in their Global Fraud Study ranked government and public administration second after the banking and financial services in terms of victimized organizations.…”