Intentions

Enç, Berent

doi:10.1093/0199256020.003.0007

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 74 publications

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“…5. See Bishop (1989), Brand (1984), Bratman (1987), Davidson (1963), Enç (2003), Goldman (1970), and Mele (1992), among many others.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

Brent

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…5. See Bishop (1989), Brand (1984), Bratman (1987), Davidson (1963), Enç (2003), Goldman (1970), and Mele (1992), among many others.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

Brent

2017

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…As Dowding and Van Hees (2007) present it, the argument from preference-dependence employs a notion of intentionality that is implausibly narrow. People intend the means they choose for achieving their aims (Searle 1983; Adams 1986; Bratman 1987; Moya 1991; Enç 2003). This uncontroversial platitude about intentions entails that the key premise of the argument from preference-dependence is mistaken: Ami can in fact not plausibly deny that she intends to prevent Fred from buying the book.…”

Section: Preference-dependencementioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom Under an Indifferent Dictator: Intentionality and Responsibility

Hindriks¹

2016

Economics and Philosophy

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Abstract:Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality.

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“…This assumption of mental causation lies at the very heart of the common-sense conception of human agency (Horgan & Woodward, 1985; D'Andrade, 1987; Greenwood, 1991; Malle, 1999 and 2004, for instance). It plays a central role in philosophical theories of human action (Davidson, 1963; Goldman, 1970; Bratman, 1987, and Enç, 2003, for instance), and it has also been at the core of many psychological theories of intentional action and motivation after Freud and after the fall of behaviorism (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Triandis, 1977; Ajzen, 1985; Locke & Latham, 1990; Heckhausen, 1991; Gollwitzer, 1993; Austin & Vancouver, 1996, for instance).…”

Section: The Conscious Self As a Spectatormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This holds for basic and nonbasic actions. Roughly, nonbasic actions are things that we do by doing something else , and basic actions are things that we do without doing something else (see Enç, 2003, for instance). Usually, nonbasic actions are naturally described as goals or act consequences.…”

Section: Apparent Mental Causation and The Illusion Of Conscious Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation.

Schlosser¹

2012

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

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Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence concerning the confabulation of reason explanations provide further support for this view. In response, I will propose an alternative model of "real mental causation" that can accommodate the empirical evidence just as well as Wegner's. Further, we will see that there is plenty of evidence in support of the assumption that intentions are causally efficacious. This will provide us with ample reason to endorse the model of real mental causation.

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Intentions

Cited by 7 publications

References 74 publications

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

Freedom Under an Indifferent Dictator: Intentionality and Responsibility

Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation.

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