Intentionality and Prehension

Gier, Nicholas F.

doi:10.5840/process19766318

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…(Whitehead, 1927(Whitehead, -8/1978 Effectively, then, propositions are material-semiotic hybrids that both incite and entrain the felt interests that are constitutive of the experiences of subjects. Gier (1976) shows that Whitehead's concept of prehension closely resembles the concept of primordial intentionality developed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. He demonstrates that both concepts owe something to William James' feelings of relation and tendency; both reject substance metaphysics and emphasise becoming, temporality and process; and both emphasise the internal relations between the world as it appears and the subject for whom it appears.…”

Section: Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 81%

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Affect—or feeling (after Leys)

Cromby

Willis

2016

Theory & Psychology

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In recent years the 'affective turn' has permeated the arts, humanities, social sciences, and psychology, but like any influential academic movement has not escaped critique. We outline and agree in general terms with the critique by Leys (2011b), which emphasises the influence of the basic emotion paradigm; the dualisms that accompany its deployment; and concerns regarding intentionality and meaning. We then propose an alternate approach to affect and feeling, derived from the philosophies of Whitehead and Langer; demonstrate how this avoids the endorsement of cognitivism to which Leys critique succumbs; illustrate the strengths of this approach with respect to analyses of former U.S. President Reagan; and highlight two strengths of affect theory which are compatible with it. We conclude that our approach closes the intentionality gap that Leys identifies whilst retaining a fruitful emphasis upon the affective realm. Affect -or feeling? (after Leys)In recent years the 'affective turn' -a central concern with, and analytic focus upon, the phenomena designated by terms such as affect, emotion and feeling -has permeated the arts, humanities and social sciences, and is now influential within disciplines including literary studies, geography, history, cultural studies, sociology, criminology, social theory and political theory (for an introductory overview see Gregg & Seigworth, 2010). 1At the same time, the affective turn is becoming increasingly influential within psychology. With respect to theoretical psychology, Brown and Stenner (2001) discuss the relevance of Spinoza's ethics. His ethics of knowing posits that body and mind are two attributes of the same substance, and proposes that increasing the capacity of the body to both be affected and to affect others is the means by which the knowing subject progresses; Brown and Stenner utilise Spinoza's position to argue for a post-cognitive understanding of emotion.More recently, Falmagne (2011) has argued that the affective roots of thought are underemphasized in psychology, and that consequently the enmeshed biographical links between the affective life of the knowing subject and her/his 'mental' life -the personal, societal and transgenerational influences that affectively shape thought -require elaboration.Whilst Brown and Stenner (2001) and Falmagne (2011) have different starting points (and their writing is separated by a decade), they share a concern for re-thinking the relationship between what have traditionally been considered as separate psychological realms: feeling, emotion or the affective and thought, cognition or the mental. This concern, which frequently animates work associated with the affect turn, is one we also share.The turn to affect has also been taken up in social and critical psychology. Blackman and Cromby (2007) argued that affect theory provides a conceptual language for addressing embodied subjectivity, allowing (critical) social psychologists to move away from a focus solely on discourse and language, and affording opportuniti...

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Section: Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 81%

“…In the same way that intentionality is always “consciousness of an object,” prehension is always “feeling of some datum.” This means that any prehensive unification or intentional act is codetermined by the respective data. (Gier, 1976, p. 201)…”

Section: A Psychology Of Feelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Affect—or feeling (after Leys)

Cromby

Willis

2016

Theory & Psychology

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“…Fully articulating a feeling or emotion means locating our self in the world and articulating (or not, as the case may be) that orientation to objects, to others, and to ends or goals. This means, though, that for pragmatist and phenomenological thinkers, like those I have been referring to here, intentional and emotional action emerges prior to conscious reflection on the world or upon our actions within it (Gier, ). If and when we become conscious of our actions and emotions, we do so when are already directed towards objects or others within our world.…”

Section: The Relational and Embodied Emotional Selfmentioning

confidence: 98%

The emotional self: Embodiment, reflexivity, and emotion regulation

Burkitt

2018

Social & Personality Psych

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Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition, and consciousness in realising emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article, I suggest an alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances, the self gets overwhelmed by emotion and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one's feelings and being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.

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A Bibliography of the Noema

Daniel

1992

The Phenomenology of the Noema

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Intentionality and Prehension

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Affect—or feeling (after Leys)

Affect—or feeling (after Leys)

The emotional self: Embodiment, reflexivity, and emotion regulation

A Bibliography of the Noema

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