Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite

Abstract

Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or 'lite' notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach's approach to team-agency theory in terms of framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions

Shared intentions, loose groups, and pooled knowledge

“…Kutz (2000), Ludwig (2007Ludwig ( , 2016, and Pacherie (2013), in contrast, do not feature a common knowledge condition, so we call them "thin accounts". Here again, a terminological clarification is in order.…”

What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours

“…The possibility of collective reasoning became central in the literature dealing with collective or joint intentions, with Tuomela and Miller (1988), Searle (1990), Gilbert (1992), or Bratman (1993. Collective intentions can indeed be interpreted as the outcome of TR, as in Gold and Sugden (2007a) or Pacherie (2013). Tuomela (2009) however criticises this view, on the basis that a conscious process of maximisation is not compatible with the existence of 'spontaneous' collective intentions.…”

Responsibility for states' actions: Normative issues at the intersection of collective agency and state responsibility

“…If it is something more, such as intentional causation, or controlled causation, then it's an open question whether citizens author the state's actions. Similarly, we need to appeal to accounts of collective knowledge, collective belief, collective intention, and so on (e.g., Bratman, ; Gilbert, , ; Pacherie, ) to figure out whether the “citizenry” is capable of having these things, and therefore whether it is plausible to attribute culpable actions to it.…”

“…But it is of course open to someone interested in this topic to take the second (i.e., desiderata-based) approach by arguing for a different set of desiderata, which might in turn lead them to different conclusions when it comes to our target question. Similarly, we need to appeal to accounts of collective knowledge, collective belief, collective intention, and so on (e.g., Bratman, 1993;Gilbert, 1987Gilbert, , 2008Pacherie, 2013) to figure out whether the "citizenry" is capable of having these things, and therefore whether it is plausible to attribute culpable actions to it.…”