Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review

Moore, James W.; Obhi, Sukhvinder S.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002

Cited by 454 publications

(423 citation statements)

References 58 publications

(70 reference statements)

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“…Interval reproductions that are shorter than the actual length of the interval represent temporal binding between the events, whereby the events are perceived as closer together -'bound' -in time. This measure is thought to be a valid implicit measure of the degree of agency that the cognitive system ascribes to a given event Haggard et al, 2002;Moore & Obhi, 2012). In each experiment, we found temporal binding under conditions of agency, but not under passive conditions, replicating prior work (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009;Haggard et al, 2002;Humphreys & Buehner, 2010;Moore & Obhi, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

“…This measure is thought to be a valid implicit measure of the degree of agency that the cognitive system ascribes to a given event Haggard et al, 2002;Moore & Obhi, 2012). In each experiment, we found temporal binding under conditions of agency, but not under passive conditions, replicating prior work (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009;Haggard et al, 2002;Humphreys & Buehner, 2010;Moore & Obhi, 2012). Of critical interest was whether task-related (Experiment 1), taskunrelated (Experiment 2) and mental (Experiment 3) effort would modulate this effect of agency on temporal interval reproduction.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 70%

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Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

2016

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We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions and their outcomes. This effect is known as 'intentional binding', and may provide feedback regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3).Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related (Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual's explicit appraisal of exertion, while the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated (physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource depletion and action control during strain.Keywords: Sense of agency, temporal binding, intentional binding, experience of effort, time perception. EFFORT DISRUPTS IMPLICIT AGENCY 3 Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agencyIt is important that the human motor system can efficiently process events which are the result of its own actions, and to discriminate these from events in the world for which it is not responsible. For instance, if I kick a ball and it knocks over and smashes a vase of flowers, I know my action of kicking the ball was responsible for the vase smashing. Selfauthored events like this tend to be easy to identify and this feeling that 'I did it' is known as a sense of agency. Some actions are more effortful than others; kicking a ball as hard as one can might break a vase, but so might brushing one's arm against it as one walks past it precariously positioned near the edge of a table. Both these actions have the same outcome, but might require the action monitoring system to respond differently in order to correctly ascribe agency. Here, we tested the role of physical and mental effort on the ascription of sense of agency, using an implicit measure.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 78%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 70%

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

2016

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“…For example, a binding-like effect can emerge between the "action" of an intentionless machine and a consequent flash [33]. It is important to keep in mind that this emphasis on causality stands against a backdrop of several studies emphasizing the importance of intentionality in this illusion [34]. Interestingly, while the focus of the effect has always been the interval between the action and the resulting sensory event, one recent study suggests that a similar temporal binding can occur between an imperative stimulus and an action, i.e.…”

Section: Time Perception In the Context Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How the motor system both encodes and influences our sense of time

Merchant¹,

Yarrow

2016

Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences

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Several lines of evidence suggest that motoric brain structures may form the core amodal component of a neural network supporting a wide range of timed behaviours. Here, we review recent findings which elucidate the neural computations that occur within motor regions, and in particular the supplementary motor area, in order to support precisely timed actions. Although motor activity may help us represent time, it is also clear that action both enriches and complicates the interpretation of sensory inputs. Hence, in the second half of this review, we also consider the latest findings regarding the perceptual distortions that our actions can impose upon the subjective timeline.3

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“…This shift is compared with a baseline condition containing only a tone and no action. Importantly, involuntary movements are not sufficient to cause perceptual shifts of the tone, and a volitional signal appears necessary (12)(13)(14). A further control group of participants also judged the time of the tone following an involuntary movement, but had never experienced any association between involuntary and voluntary movement.…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Extending experiences of voluntary action by association

Khalighinejad

Haggard

2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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"Sense of agency" refers to the experience that links one's voluntary actions to their external outcomes. It remains unclear whether this ubiquitous experience is hardwired, arising from specific signals within the brain's motor systems, or rather depends on associative learning, through repeated cooccurrence of voluntary movements and their outcomes. To distinguish these two models, we asked participants to trigger a tone by a voluntary keypress action. The voluntary action was always associated with an involuntary movement of the other hand. We then tested whether the combination of the involuntary movement and tone alone might now suffice to produce a sense of agency, even when the voluntary action was omitted. Sense of agency was measured using an implicit marker based on time perception, namely a shift in the perceived time of the outcome toward the action that caused it. Across two experiments, repeatedly pairing an involuntary movement with a voluntary action induced key temporal features of agency, with the outcome now perceived as shifted toward the involuntary movement. This shift required involuntary movements to have been previously associated with voluntary actions. We show that some key aspects of agency may be transferred from voluntary actions to involuntary movements. An internal volitional signal is required for the primary acquisition of agency but, with repeated association, the involuntary movement in itself comes to produce some key temporal features of agency over the subsequent outcome. This finding may explain how humans can develop an enduring sense of agency in nonnatural cases, like brainmachine interfaces. I n a series of brilliant experiments, Roger Sperry switched the nerves for flexion of the rat hind leg with the nerves for extension. After that, whenever the bottom of the foot was injured, the rat extended the foot instead of flexing it. Rats never learned to lift up the paw, and "no adaptive functioning of the nervous system took place" (1). When the optic nerves of salamanders were cut, and the eyeball rotated 180°, salamanders saw upside down for the rest of their lives (2). These experiments suggested that key sensorimotor brain circuits are largely hardwired, and impervious to modification by experience."Sense of agency" refers to the capacity to control one's actions and, through them, the external world. Sense of agency is fundamental to instrumental and goal-directed actions, and forms the cornerstone of humans' astonishing capacity to change their physical and social environment (3). However, it remains unclear how the brain produces this distinctive and important subjective experience. Some recent results have linked the sense of agency to specific preparatory volitional signals in frontal (4) and parietal (5) areas, which then trigger voluntary motor commands passing through the "final common path" (6) of the primary motor cortex. Importantly, these "volitional signals" were generated well before the occurrence of both action and outcome, and were strongly correlated ...

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Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review

Cited by 454 publications

References 58 publications

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

How the motor system both encodes and influences our sense of time

Extending experiences of voluntary action by association

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