Intentional action, chance and control

Kraemer, Eric Russert

doi:10.1093/analys/38.3.116

Cited by 5 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…7 7 This echoes both Ross (1978) and Kraemer's (1978) solutions to Analysis Problem No. 16, both of whom appeal to differences of control to explain the asymmetry between dice‐rolling and shooting.…”

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confidence: 71%

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Can the mind wander intentionally?

Murray

Krasich

2020

Mind & Language

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Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering.

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confidence: 71%

“… See Mele (2009, pp. 18-19).7 This echoes bothRoss (1978) andKraemer's (1978) solutions to Analysis Problem No. 16, both of whom appeal to…”

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confidence: 93%

Can the mind wander intentionally?

Murray

Krasich

2020

Mind & Language

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“…It has been pointed out (Davies 1981;Kraemer 1978;Mele and Sverdlik 1996;Ross 1978;Stiffler 1981) that the scenarios in the Butler (1978) problem are structurally different. Nadelhoffer (2004) investigated both the dimension of the moral valence of the consequences (immoral vs. neutral) as well as the structure of the action (shooting vs. throwing a die).…”

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confidence: 99%

Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect

Paprzycka-Hausman

2018

Synthese

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The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190-194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474-498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur) rather than a predictive claim (knowledge that harm will actually occur). I use the omissions account (Paprzycka in Mind Lang 30(5):550-571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. in Monist 95(2):264-289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slightchance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for a very careful reading of the text and for making valuable criticisms and suggestions that made rethink many of the issues discussed in the paper. I am very grateful to Bartosz Maćkiewicz who not only helped to implement the studies in Lime Survey, ran the studies, carried out or served as a consultant on many statistical analyses, but who also put forward constructive criticisms. Many thanks are due to Katarzyna Kuś (for all kinds of help), Michał Barcz,

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“…BADANIE NADELHOFFERA Nadelhoffer (2004) przeprowadził empiryczne badanie sprawdzające, jak przypisywana jest intencjonalność w sytuacjach Butlera, starał się przy tym zniwelować różnice strukturalne występujące w oryginalnych eksperymentach myślowych Butlera (por. też Davies 1981, Kraemer 1978, Mele, Sverdlik 1996, Ross 1978, Stiffler 1981). Nadelhoffer przedstawił badanym cztery historyjki.…”

Section: Hipoteza Zaniechaniowa a Efekt Epistemiczny W Kontekście Problemu Butleraunclassified

Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej

Paprzycka-Hausman

2018

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EPISTEMIC SIDE-EFFECT EFFECT AND BUTLER'S PROBLEM: A TEST FOR THE OMISSIONS ACCOUNTThe omissions account offers structurally close explanations of the Knobe effect, the Butler problem, and the epistemic side-effect effect. Moreover, it predicts that the epistemic side-effect effect should be present not only in Knobe-type stories but also in Butler-type stories. Since the probability that the effect takes place is not greater than 1/6, the attribution of knowledge that it will take place is prima facie irrational. However, according to the omissions account, in the immoral situations, the knowledge claim can be read as a consequence-knowledge claim, which can be rationally accepted. I report the results of two studies, based on Nadelhoffer's study of the Butler problem, where ascriptions of knowledge in Butler-type scenarios are investigated.

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Intentional action, chance and control

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Can the mind wander intentionally?

Can the mind wander intentionally?

Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect

Epistemiczny efekt Knobe’a a problem Butlera. Test hipotezy zaniechaniowej

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