Intention, interpretation and the computational structure of language

Abstract

I show how a conversational process that takes simple, intuitively meaningful steps may be understood as a sophisticated computation that derives the richly detailed, complex representations implicit in our knowledge of language. To develop the account, I argue that natural language is structured in a way that lets us formalize grammatical knowledge precisely in terms of rich primitives of interpretation. Primitives of interpretation can be correctly viewed intentionally, as explanations of our choices of linguistic actions; the model therefore fits our intuitions about meaning in conversation. Nevertheless, interpretations for complex utterances can be built from these primitives by simple operations of grammatical derivation. In bridging analyses of meaning at semantic and symbol-processing levels, this account underscores the fundamental place for computation in the cognitive science of language use.

Deixis (Even Without Pointing)*

“…But that's not how the interpretation proceeds. We take this as strong evidence against the idea that speakers and hearers must coordinate directly on demonstrative referents, a common view in both formal and computational semantics (Neale, ; Stone, , King, forthcoming, a; forthcoming, b). What audience has to do is recognize the coherence relation that ties the utterance to the preceding discourse and the ongoing activity; but once this has been done, there's no need for further reasoning about speaker's referential intentions in order to resolve the reference of a demonstrative, beyond the fact that the speaker uttered that sentence .…”

Intention structures in BPMN processes

“…In [13], Konolige et al present a theory of intention representation that provides solutions to representational problems in order to fill an important gap in existing theories of agents, planning and collaborative planning. In [12], Stone has attempted to formalize natural language grammatical knowledge using intentional structures in discourses. In this paper, we have used intention to model a restricted form of temporal awareness that helps agent perform actions at points where the agent thinks appropriate.…”

Situated communication for joint activity in human-robot teams

“…This requirement sets the context for what kinds of meanings to construct (intension) and how to link that to actual experience (denotation). 8,9 Human-robot communication in a task-oriented setting such as USAR is typically highly controlled. Dialogue follows specific structures and uses specific formulations.…”