Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism

Marušić, Berislav; Schwenkler, John

doi:10.1111/phib.12133

Cited by 32 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…As we will see, I do not think this means that the ground of my practical knowledge is non-evidential (c.f. Small 2012; Marušić and Schwenkler 2018). Rather, on my account, the knowledge in question is quite literally self-evident, that is, what is known provides evidence for itself.…”

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confidence: 79%

Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account

Hadisi¹

2021

Res Phil.

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I argue that practical knowledge can be understood as constituted by a kind of imagining. In particular, it is the knowledge of what I am doing when that knowledge is represented via extramental imagination. Two results follow. First, on this account, we can do justice both to the cognitive character and the practical character of practical knowledge. And second, we can identify a condition under which imagination becomes factive, and thus a source of objective evidence. I develop this view by extracting an account of self-knowledge via extramental imagination from the writings of Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240.In this paper, I consider two seemingly unrelated philosophical puzzles, one about the epistemic role of imagination, and the other about the concept of practical knowledge. I then argue that we can make headways on both fronts by recognizing the relationship between a species of imagination (which I will call creative imagination) and practical knowledge.In section 1, I lay out the two puzzles. In section 2, I make a brief historical detour, and extract an account of imagination's role in producing knowledge from Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240 in Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam [e Ringstones of Wisdom] (1229). In section 3, I argue for my main thesis, namely that practical knowing is a kind of imagining. I then explain how my thesis helps us with the original puzzles of the paper.[...] But how can a single mental activity successfully be put to both uses?

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confidence: 79%

Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account

Hadisi¹

2021

Res Phil.

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“…I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify this issue. 25 Perhaps they believe this because they think an intention that p is, in fact, a belief that p. For a view like this see, for example, Setiya (2003Setiya ( , 2008Setiya ( , 2009), Velleman (1989Velleman ( , 2007 and Marusic and Schwenkler (2018). 26 At least not directly, but what I go on to say will suggest why I think this view is false.…”

Section: Intention-belief Consistencymentioning

confidence: 97%

Requirements of intention in light of belief

Núñez

2019

Philos Stud

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Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms (all roughly formulated) include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe. When such agents do not form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe, they need not be irrational if they do not conform to these requirements.

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“…But this by itself is no cause for concern-indeed, this seems to be precisely what noncognitivists should say about such cases. 20 For defense of a doxastic condition on intention, see, among others, Grice (1971); Audi (1973); Harman (1976); Davis (1984); Wallace (2001); Marušić and Schwenkler (2018). cannot intend to go to the movies unless she desires to go to the movies.…”

Section: Intentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A solution to the many attitudes problem

Beddor

2019

Philos Stud

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According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great e ort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.

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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism

Cited by 32 publications

References 51 publications

Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account

Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: an Akbariyya Account

Requirements of intention in light of belief

A solution to the many attitudes problem

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