2018
DOI: 10.1007/s40565-018-0427-z
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Intelligent data attacks against power systems using incomplete network information: a review

Abstract: With the integration of information technologies, power system operations are increasingly threatened by cyber-attacks. It has even been revealed that an attacker can inject false data into real-time measurements stealthily without knowing the full configuration (e.g., network topology) of a power system. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review on false data injection attacks which utilize barrier conditions, blind identification techniques and data driven approaches to overcome limitations of incompl… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, to avoid false alarms due to physical anomalies, an anomaly classification procedure is necessary for developing cybersecurity solutions. While a substantial body of literature is devoted to address the cyber-physical security of power grids [43]- [46], the deployment of cyber-physical security solutions in realworld power systems is still in a nascent stage. Recently, the dynamic watermarking method [47] has been used to detect malicious attacks on the sensors in prototypical microgrids [34], and tested via simulation on attacks on the AGC loop [41] (See Figure 8).…”
Section: B Cyber-physical Security Of Control Loopsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Therefore, to avoid false alarms due to physical anomalies, an anomaly classification procedure is necessary for developing cybersecurity solutions. While a substantial body of literature is devoted to address the cyber-physical security of power grids [43]- [46], the deployment of cyber-physical security solutions in realworld power systems is still in a nascent stage. Recently, the dynamic watermarking method [47] has been used to detect malicious attacks on the sensors in prototypical microgrids [34], and tested via simulation on attacks on the AGC loop [41] (See Figure 8).…”
Section: B Cyber-physical Security Of Control Loopsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If a DC model is assumed, as seen, no disclosure resources are needed. Recent works proceed by relaxing/removing the strong assumptions, first of all, that of perfect knowledge of system-wide information and parameters (see, e.g., surveys [47,48]). In [49], only full knowledge in a limited attack region is assumed, and a bi-level SE-FDIA model for causing physical disruption (line overloading) is discussed.…”
Section: Attack Design Under Reduced Assumptions Pmu Measurements and Ac Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To reduce NTL, power supply companies need to take the necessary measures to detect electricity theft behaviors. However, the traditional means need expensive manpower in the on-the-spot inspection of electricity meters of consumers, and only a small part of electricity theft cases can be detected successfully [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%