Intelligence agencies and democratisation: Continuity and change in Serbia after Milošević

Truly Reforming or Just Responding to Failures? Lessons Learned from the Modernisation of the Greek National Intelligence Service

“…The law also established a new state body, the National Security Council, in order to coordinate and control the above agencies. Whether these efforts will provide fl exibility and better oversight of these agencies remains to be seen (Edmunds, 2008).…”

Democratization in Serbia: An Analysis of Rational Choice and Structuralist Explanations

“…Several examples will illustrate the latter. First, major obstacles to democratization included the many state institutions, such as the state security and intelligence agencies, which contained illiberal elements (Edmunds 2009;Gordy 2004, 15). As noted by Edmunds (2009, 128) even in the face of unprecedented internal and external pressures for democratic change, illiberal interests, actors, and networks found ways to survive, adapt, and even thrive.…”

“…As noted by Edmunds (2009, 128) even in the face of unprecedented internal and external pressures for democratic change, illiberal interests, actors, and networks found ways to survive, adapt, and even thrive. However, in the context of subsequent democratization efforts, the pro-democracy leadership was successful in negotiating a limited, secret pact with the Serbian intelligence and security agencies in support of democratization (Edmunds, 2008). The arrangement resulted in these institutions not directly interfering with political reforms, and passively supporting the leadership, so long as their own organizations and members were left alone (ibid.).…”

“…While the decisions to implement democratic reforms may seem straightforward given the extensive democracy promotion assistance during the Milosevic era (Presnall 2009;Spoerri 2010) as well as subsequent democracy promotion initiatives (Edmunds 2009, 129), it should not be taken for granted. Key institutions have resisted democratic reform (Edmunds 2008;Bieber 2011) and segments of Serbian society have expressed affinity for the values of authoritarian collectivism and redistributive statism (Lazic and Cvejic 2007). Given the latter, this paper will outline two different accounts of the process of democratization in Serbia -one rooted in rational choice or voluntarism, the other in structuralism.…”

Intelligent design? : transforming intelligence in Georgia and Serbia

“…This new constitution gave the constituent republics increased autonomy which was reflected throughout Yugoslavia's bureaucracy, although this was far less pronounced in the JNA and in the security apparatus, as the SDB continued to report to the Ministry of the ally more than a subordinate of Milosevic, at least until he became the Yugoslav president in 1997. 172 The 1991 Law of Internal Affairs created two branches for the MUP, namely the SDB and the Public Security Department. 173 These two branches had separate, parallel structures throughout the country and the SDB tended to answer directly to the president, although it was nominally under the control of the Minister of the Interior.…”