Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States

Accountability and oversight in the Dutch intelligence and security domains in the digital age

“…Similarly, independent and objective media, interest groups, and civil society play a role as overseers (Born and Wills, 2012, p. 6). However, their role is restricted due to intrinsic facts surrounding intelligence, such as access and release of classified information (van Puyvelde, 2013).…”

Towards democratic intelligence oversight: Limits, practices, struggles

“…Damien Van Puyvelde writes that 'whistleblowers are particularly valuable because they provide alternative sources of information that, by definition, are not controlled by the government. ' 69 For Claudia Hillebrand too, 'media outlets can provide a channel for leaking information that might not have been taken into account by formal oversight bodies, or when individuals felt unable to approach formal oversight bodies and instead approached journalists. ' 70 Finally, Aldrich points out that 'regulation by revelation' has seen activists and media pressure groups performing a de facto, albeit problematic oversight role, in that 'these organisations have no democratic mandate and are not concerned with effectiveness. '…”

Towards intelligence accountability as a virtue

“…20 Puyvelde helpfully explains the relationship between the three: '(b)ased on available information, the accountability holder makes reference to standards to assess the accountability holdee's conduct, redirect him or her, and sometimes apply available sanctions.' 21 Accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure that government organisations and officials operate within the established framework of law and norms democratically decided upon by the legislature and are answerable for how they do their business. 22 Research approaching accountability as a mechanism generally evaluates control mechanisms, looks for loopholes and suggests solutions.…”

“…49 While this approach is excellent for assessing the legal frameworks and their shortcomings in a specific liberal democratic system, it does not tell us much about the relationship between the actor and the forum, instead mainly emphasising the condition of the standards. Other studies apply a broader conceptualisation in line with Bovens' 50 or refer to a slightly different formulation by emphasising the answerability of the intelligence services to established forums and emphasising access to information. 51 For example, Eijkman and Weggemans, who analyse the challenges of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for intelligence accountability, base their argument on the notion that 'accountability should entail that the actual process and outcome of data collection (…) is subject to review or sanctions.'…”