Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Falvey, Rod; Foster, Neil; Greenaway, David

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00343.x

Cited by 240 publications

(153 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…By some authors (Falvey, Foster and Greenaway, 2006) the intellectual property was considered to be a public good, therefore non-rivalrous and sometimes non-excludable, which was the reason for governmental or intergovernmental intervention. The incentive of IPP was considered necessary for inducing companies to invest in R&D and speeding up innovations and therefore economic growth.…”

Section: Theoretical Arguments Prevailing In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the world outside this handful of developed countries the situation is different. Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2006) argue the impact of IPP protection on economic growth is likely to depend upon the country in question, in particular on its level of development and its ability to innovate and imitate. It is also argued that relationship between IPP and growth is a nonlinear one with countries with high incomes per capita likely to grow more rapidly, the stronger is the IPP.…”

Section: Theoretical Arguments Prevailing In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Some Effects of Intellectual Property Protection on National Economies: Theoretical and Econometric Study

Evan¹,

Vozárová²,

Bolotov³

2018

Prague Economic Papers

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This paper aims to theoretically derive and afterwards econometrically assess the impact of intellectual property protection (IPP) on national economies. The authors' main hypothesis is that by creating a form of non-market protection, IPP limits free competition and has no positive effects on national economies and the world economy in general. The hypothesis is tested through estimation of relationship between charges for the use of intellectual property and 1) gross domestic product, 2) GDP growth, 3) unemployment, 4) exports of high-tech products, 5) FDI outflow, and 6) expenses on research and development in a panel dataset of 146 countries in years 2005-2014 based Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panel models. The data tells us that changes in these charges have not a significant impact on the studied indicators, which counts against claims of positive impact of IPP on economies and growth.

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Section: Theoretical Arguments Prevailing In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Arguments Prevailing In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Some Effects of Intellectual Property Protection on National Economies: Theoretical and Econometric Study

Evan¹,

Vozárová²,

Bolotov³

2018

Prague Economic Papers

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“…This has been neglected in most previous work on intellectual property and development, which tend to treat TRIPS as having uniform implications for developing countries, and ignore details of TRIPS implementation (Ivus 2010;Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway 2006;Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway 2009;Qian 2007). The effects of TRIPS on outcomes of interest (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

TRIPS Implementation and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil and India

Sampat

Shadlen

2015

St Comp Int Dev

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This article compares national approaches toward secondary pharmaceutical patents. Because secondary patents can extend periods of exclusivity and delay generic competition, they can raise prices and reduce access to medicines. Little is known about what measures countries have enacted policies to address applications for secondary pharmaceutical patents, how they function, and whether, in practice, these measures limit secondary patents. We analyze the cases of India and Brazil. We assemble data on pharmaceutical patent applications filed in the two countries, code each application to identify which constitute secondary applications, and examine outcomes for each application in both countries. The data indicate that Brazil is less likely to grant applications than India, but in both countries the measures designed to limit secondary patents are having little direct effect. This suggests, on the one hand, that critics of these policies, such as the transnational pharmaceutical sector and foreign governments, may be more worried than they should be. On the other hand, champions of the policies, such as NGOs and international organizations, may have cause for concern that laws on the books are not having the expected impact on patent outcomes in practice. Our findings also suggest that, at the drug level, the effects of countries' approaches toward secondary patents need to be understood in the context of their broader approaches toward TRIPS implementation, including when and how they introduced pharmaceutical patents in the 1990s and 2000s.

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“…The first consists of scholars who advocate that economic development is facilitated by enhanced protection of IPRs (Gould & Gruben, 1996;Falvey et al, 2006). According to this school, the positive nexus is facilitated via an appealing effect of stronger IPRs on factor productivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments

2016

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This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries for the period 1994-2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money supply and respect of the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy because of equitably distributed wealth increases with increasing software piracy levels. Hence, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an increasing function of software piracy. Moreover the relationships between policy instruments and software piracy display various patterns, namely: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy implications of our study.JEL Classification: F42, K42, O34, O38, O57

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Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Cited by 240 publications

References 30 publications

Some Effects of Intellectual Property Protection on National Economies: Theoretical and Econometric Study

Some Effects of Intellectual Property Protection on National Economies: Theoretical and Econometric Study

TRIPS Implementation and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting in Brazil and India

Fighting Software Piracy: Some Global Conditional Policy Instruments

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