Integration of safety analysis in model-driven software development

Abstract

Safety critical software requires integrating verification techniques in software development methods. Software architectures must guarantee that developed systems will meet safety requirements and safety analyses are frequently used in the assessment. Safety engineers and software architects must reach a common understanding on an optimal architecture from both perspectives. Currently both groups of engineers apply different modelling techniques and languages: safety analysis models and software modelling languages. The solutions proposed seek to integrate both domains coupling the languages of each domain. It constitutes a sound example of the use of language engineering to improve efficiency in a software-related domain. A model-driven development approach and the use of a platform-independent language are used to bridge the gap between safety analyses (failure mode effects and criticality analysis and fault tree analysis) and software development languages (e.g. unified modelling language). Language abstract syntaxes (metamodels), profiles, language mappings (model transformations) and language refinements, support the direct application of safety analysis to software architectures for the verification of safety requirements. Model consistency and the possibility of automation are found among the benefits.

Testing proper mitigation in safety-critical systems: An aerospace Launch application

“…They map a fault tree to a PN using a set of mapping rules (FT-PN). Miguel et al [8] introduce a model driven development approach and the use of a platform-independent language to bridge the gap between safety analyses (FTA and failure mode effects and criticality analysis) and software development languages such as UML.…”

Formal approach on modeling and predicting of software system security: Stochastic petri net

“…However this practice is subjective to the kind of people consisting of the Tiger Team and thus is non-reproducible [5]. There have been some approaches which focus on the process which is adopted while the software is being developed to access the security of final product [5]. One example of this is the SSECMM or Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model.…”

“…There have been some attempts to quantify the security of software system by means of Tiger Team Penetration practices, where a group of experts sit together and try to break in by exploiting any weakness it might possess. However this practice is subjective to the kind of people consisting of the Tiger Team and thus is non-reproducible [5]. There have been some approaches which focus on the process which is adopted while the software is being developed to access the security of final product [5].…”

“…For the accuracy and other reasons, state-based approaches are usually adopted [7]. Markov model has been adapted in most previous state-based approaches [1,5,8,9,10]. Some disadvantages are inevitable in using Markov models as modeling tools.…”

Integration of Component Fault Trees into the UML

“…They concentrate on recurring safety analysis model constructs and automatically construct parts of the safety analysis model at a high level. The annotations presented in [4] can be applied to all elements of the design model. The used annotations are generically defined to cover the whole design space and to allow a detailed deduction of the safety analysis model.…”