Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

Abstract

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-ofthe-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models.

An Exploratory Study on the Application of Blockchain Technology to the Chinese Ship Auction Market

“…Determining jurisdiction in disputes, the legal status of smart contracts, and compliance with international regulations can be challenging in blockchain-based auction systems. The lack of clear regulatory frameworks can hinder the adoption and implementation of blockchain in auction markets (Shi et al, 2021). The Chinese ship auction market involves many participants, necessitating intricate policies and regulations to govern market conduct.…”

Trust-Aware V2V Relay-Assisted Content Distribution in Cellular V2X Networks

“…max , C5.2 : 0 ≤ P r k ≤ P r max (36) where P d i , P c m , and P r k denote the optimal power for V2V users, cellular users, and relay vehicles, respectively. It is proved that problem P3 can only achieve optimum if P c m = P c max , P r k = P r max or P d i = P d max and γ a v i,j = γ b v i,j [16].…”

“…The Vickery double auction model is not able to jointly achieve truthfulness, budget balance, and rationality. Similarly, the McAfee auction is also not applicable to our proposed scheme due to its homogeneity [36], [37]. To suit our problem, we introduced an improved auction model that satisfied the economic properties of auctions.…”

Blockchain-based 6G Inter-Provider Agreements: Auction vs. Marketplace

“…However, Ethereum is highly decentralized (decentralization is critical for network security and preventing a chain from being hijacked by those validating it). Therefore, Ethereum is still considered the preferred choice for most use cases [7]. Furthermore, another contribution of this paper is to provide evaluation through emulation, comparing both approaches (marketplace and auction) and drawing conclusions based on the results.…”