2007
DOI: 10.1017/s0305741007002056
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Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party's Embrace of the Private Sector

Abstract: Is privatization in China leading to political change? This article presents original survey data from 1999 and 2005 to evaluate the Communist Party's strategy towards the private sector. The CCP is increasingly integrating itself with the private sector, both by co-opting entrepreneurs into the Party and encouraging current Party members to go into business. It has opened the political system to private entrepreneurs, but still screens which ones are allowed to play political roles. Because of their close per… Show more

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Cited by 158 publications
(63 citation statements)
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“…She has further argued that a reliance on political networks and bureaucratic structures is a unique characteristic of the municipal economy and highlights the importance of the patron-client network to economic development (Oi 1999). Similar arguments have also been formulated from perspectives of the interactions between political and economic elites (Shirk 1993;Dickson 2008) and the bond between governments and enterprises (Lu and Pan 2009); the general consensus is that the intimate association between political and economic elites (the marriage of power and wealth) has propelled the macro economic growth in China.…”
Section: Patron-client Network and Market Developmentmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…She has further argued that a reliance on political networks and bureaucratic structures is a unique characteristic of the municipal economy and highlights the importance of the patron-client network to economic development (Oi 1999). Similar arguments have also been formulated from perspectives of the interactions between political and economic elites (Shirk 1993;Dickson 2008) and the bond between governments and enterprises (Lu and Pan 2009); the general consensus is that the intimate association between political and economic elites (the marriage of power and wealth) has propelled the macro economic growth in China.…”
Section: Patron-client Network and Market Developmentmentioning
confidence: 85%
“…This desire has been put into practice at the cost of traditionally 'individual rights, the rights of kin groups and religious communities, and local community self-government and autonomy' (Yang, 2011: 12). This sovereign power in contemporary China is seen to be growing even stronger to form a new pattern of governance that combines 'earlier Maoist socialism, nationalist and developmentalist practices and the discourses of the Communist Party with the more recent market logic' , against which an oligarchic corporate state or neo-socialism is emerging (Dickson, 2007;Nonini, 2008: 145;Pieke, 2009). Foucault (1988) points out a direction in which technologies of power and of the self intertwine to produce a positive and active subject.…”
Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This result is somewhat surprising as we may have expected a di↵erence between the two groups, but when controlling for other characteristics this is not the case. This may be due to the fact that the party actively recruits the wealthy and highly educated (Dickson, 2007) such that falsification may be the result of these factors rather than party membership per se. Indeed, when controls are excluded from the estimates of support for censorship up to 26% of party members falsify whereas only 18% falsify among non members.…”
Section: Who Falsifies?mentioning
confidence: 99%