2015
DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586877
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Integrating power in institutional analysis: A micro-foundation perspective

Abstract: Studies of social dilemmas consistently report higher than expected levels of cooperation, especially in the presence of appropriate institutions. At the same time, scholars have argued that institutions are manifestations of power relations. The higher than expected levels of cooperation amidst widespread power asymmetries constitute an important puzzle about the linkages between power asymmetries and the outcomes of local institutional deliberation. In this paper, I develop a microfoundation-based approach t… Show more

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Cited by 40 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…the tourism industry), the defence of non-use values is by definition economically less profitable -at least in the short run. The initial focus of much of the neoinstitutionalist literature on relatively simple CPRI with model character (following rational choice approaches) might have led to underresearch power issues shaping the political decision-making procedures on the management of the commons (Theesfeld 2011;Kashwan 2015). Framing landscape conflicts in terms of value helps uncover power games surrounding the definition of the political objectives to follow in governing landscape commons.…”
Section: Discussion -Landscape As a Commonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…the tourism industry), the defence of non-use values is by definition economically less profitable -at least in the short run. The initial focus of much of the neoinstitutionalist literature on relatively simple CPRI with model character (following rational choice approaches) might have led to underresearch power issues shaping the political decision-making procedures on the management of the commons (Theesfeld 2011;Kashwan 2015). Framing landscape conflicts in terms of value helps uncover power games surrounding the definition of the political objectives to follow in governing landscape commons.…”
Section: Discussion -Landscape As a Commonsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Incorporating such power dynamics into our framework of approaches to institutional change would be a worthy consideration. Kashwan (2016) observes that the role that intra-community power differences play in explaining higher than expected levels of cooperation -and hence, in the solving of A&P dilemmasconstitutes an important puzzle in institutional analysis. We second that, and would add that the same goes for the role of power asymmetries in the relation between communities and external actors.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Kashwan (2016) discusses how power asymmetries limit weak actors from challenging unfair rules in one action arena so that leaders do not enforce additional costs in other institutional arenas. Going along with such rules allows the poor to benefit from other village institutions (Kashwan 2016) and accumulate social and symbolic capital (Kumar 2002;Cochran and Ray 2009). Such arrangements can produce inequitable social outcomes, but lead to positive evironmental outcomes (Agrawal 2001;Lele et al 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We draw upon the concept of network of adjacent action situations (NAAS) (McGinnis 2011) and inter-linked action arenas (Kashwan 2016), i.e. two action situations that are adjacent to each other where the outcomes from one action situation determine the rules of interaction that occur within the other action situation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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