Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant

Mason, T. David

doi:10.1007/bf00114875

Cited by 55 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The model presented by Faria and Arce M. becomes more a model of recruitment (from a pool of supporters) than a model of the dynamics of grassroots support for terrorism. This paper does, however, represent some of the first steps towards incorporating those aspects of popular support into economic models of terrorism that had been incorporated into models of guerrilla warfare and civil war (Intriligator and Brito 1988;Azam 2002;Grossman 1995;Mason 1996). The Faria and Arce M. analysis is similar to Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) where popular opinion and support for terrorism also operates as a factor that influences terrorist recruitment.…”

Section: Grassroots Support and The Economics O Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 58%

Switching Costs, Grassroots Support of Terrorism and the Escalation of Conflict

Phillips

2010

SSRN Journal

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relevance of 'switching costs' to the problem of terrorism and grassroots support of terrorism. Grassroots supporters that choose between the terrorist organisation and the government may face considerable costs in switching their support after their initial decision has been made. This paper presents an analysis of competition between the terrorist organisation and the government for grassroots support within a two-period economic setting. If grassroots supporters face costs, which may be either tangible or psychological costs, in switching to the government if they initially supported the terrorist organisation (and vice versa), economic theory produces results that have important policy implications. Of most importance, it can be shown that when grassroots supporters have switching costs there is more intense competition between the terrorist organisation and the government for grassroots support. Also, when grassroots supporters have switching costs, the terrorist organisation and the government must invoke more extreme measures in order to win supporters away from the other party.

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Section: Grassroots Support and The Economics O Terrorismmentioning

confidence: 58%

Switching Costs, Grassroots Support of Terrorism and the Escalation of Conflict

Phillips

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…As Cronin (2006) indicates, one of the reasons why grassroots support may be important to the terrorist organization is its supply of recruits. The Faria and Arce M. (2005) analysis represents some of the first steps towards incorporating those aspects of popular support into economic models of terrorism that had been incorporated into models of guerrilla warfare and civil war (Intriligator and Brito 1988;Azam 2002;Grossman 1995;Mason 1996). The Faria and Arce M. analysis is similar to Rosendorff and Sandler (2004), where popular opinion and support for terrorism also operates as a factor that influences terrorist recruitment.…”

Section: Grassroots Support and Economicsmentioning

confidence: 96%

The Life Cycle of Terrorist Organizations

Phillips

2011

Int Adv Econ Res

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It is a fact that terrorist organizations come and go. This empirical fact tends to draw attention to the demise of the terrorist organization and distracts from the dynamics of the terrorist organization's life cycle. In this respect, the extant literature suffers from a serious weakness that is symptomatic of the absence from the literature of a rigorous theoretical explanation for the life cycle of terrorist organizations. This paper aims to address this by developing a theoretical explanation for the life cycle of terrorist organizations that is centered on competition for grassroots or popular support between the terrorist organization and the government. The decline and demise of a particular terrorist organization is not certain ex ante and a terrorist organization may be expected to be most dangerous not in its death throes, but during its early years as it competes with the government for grassroots support. These appear to be different conclusions to those that characterise some parts of the literature on this subject. The theoretical explanation developed herein also predicts a cyclical oscillation of conflict.

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“…Evidence offered in Berman, Shapiro, and Felter suggests that to a great extent, this cooperation has to be bought. 7 Basing itself on Akerlof and Yellin's analysis of street gangs' efforts to secure popular support in the neighborhoods in which they operate and Mason's paper on insurgencies and rational peasant behavior, 8 the analysis in Berman, Shapiro, and Felter begins with the proposition that insurgents cannot function without operational security: "The population, or at least portions of it, knows what the insurgents are doing. The silence of the population, or at least a substantial portion thereof, is necessary (but not sufficient) for insurgent success.…”

Section: Real Exchange Rates and Insurgencymentioning

confidence: 98%