Insurgency and Ivory: The Territorial Origins of Illicit Resource Extraction in Civil Conflicts

Abstract

The presence of natural resources makes civil conflicts more likely to erupt, last longer, and more difficult to end. Yet rebels do not always exploit resources wherever they are present. Why? I argue that rebels extract more resources when they compete with governments over territorial authority. Territorial competition facilitates black market access, generates financial pressure, and produces governance incentives for rebels to extract natural resources. I test this proposition in a two-tiered research design. First, I show globally that moderate territorial control predicts more resource extraction by rebels. Subsequently, I focus on the example of ivory poaching which offers a rare glimpse into the usually hidden resource extraction process. I match spatially disaggregated conflict event data to subnational poaching data in conflict-affected African countries. Results show that rebels seeking territorial control substantially increase poaching rates. These findings highlight the strategic conditions under which territorial competition shapes rebel criminal behavior.

Aiding Animals: Does Foreign Aid Reduce Wildlife Crime?

“…Next, I control for the role of civil war using data from the Center from Systemic Peace. Rebel groups engage in poaching to support their activities (Haass, 2021) and research identifies a positive relationship between conflict and wildlife population declines (Daskin & Pringle, 2018). 11 The civil war variable ranges from 0 to 10, where zero denotes no civil war and 1 to 10 denote war at a range of intensities.…”

Network Competition and Civilian Targeting during Civil Conflict

“…To operationalize the role of geography within the empirical model from our study, we would require cross-national and time-varying measures of armed actors' control of geographic units. While accurately incorporating this information is beyond the scope of our study, an emerging body of research measuring the geography of armed conflict and territorial control (Anders 2020; Haass 2021; Kikuta 2022) provides a promising next step in the accumulation of knowledge on this important topic.…”

Negotiating complex issues with little fervour? Why peace processes in territorial conflicts tend to produce incomplete outcomes

“…We review earlier arguments that territorial conflicts are more persistent and argue that they can be attributed to two fundamental mechanisms that make peace negotiations especially difficult in territorial conflicts. First, a vast majority of studies describe how territorial conflicts' context and nature lower actors' overall ability and willingness to achieve any comprehensive settlement of the conflict (Fearon, 1995;Hassner, 2003Hassner, , 2006Toft, 2006;Haass, 2020;Fearon, 2004;Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009;Spaniel and Bils, 2018). A second argument implies that the most central issues in territorial conflicts, i.e., demands for secession or far-reaching autonomy, are more challenging to settle in negotiations (Walter, 2003(Walter, , 2006Toft, 2006;Erk and Anderson, 2009;Cornell, 2002;Forsberg, 2013).…”

“…One such argument states that asymmetries in time-horizons between the conflicting parties means that costs are not weighted against the same discounted future value of a possible victory (Toft, 2006). Moreover, specific features of territorial conflicts, such as higher incentives for rebels to extract natural resources, may lower their willingness to end the war (Haass, 2020). Such financial resources, coupled with the uncertainty regarding relative strength in peripheral wars worsen information and commitment problems (Fearon, 2004).…”