Insufficiently diverse: The problem of nonviolent leverage and radicalization of Ukraine’s Maidan uprising, 2013–2014

Abstract

The article explains the violent radicalization of the initially peaceful Maidan uprising in January 2014 as the result of failure to build efficient leverage against Viktor Yanukovych with nonviolent methods. Maidan lacked critical diversity of nonviolent tactics insofar as directly disruptive methods of noncooperation (e.g., strikes and boycott) remained small-scale and inefficient. The Maidan protest coalition primarily lacked social-organizational resources, i.e. authoritative civil society organizations and strong labor movement, for developing nonviolent leverage that was partially connected to gaps in ideological and regional diversity and partially to unfavorable structural conditions. However, radical nationalists actively participating in the protests possessed a unique combination of resources for initiating and diffusing efficient, coordinated, and strategic violence when it became legitimated by intensifying repressions and disillusionment in the incapacity of the oppositional political parties to propose an efficient strategy against the government. Violent radicalization facilitated geographical expansion of disruption via occupations of governmental buildings in western and central Ukrainian regions that the state was ultimately incapable of containing.

“Slava Ukraini!” Strategy and the Spirit of Ukrainian Resistance 2014–2023

“…This resort to violence emphasizes the inherent weakness of the Maidan state when it came to coordinating a sufficiently strong nonviolent strategy. Radical nationalists would play a central role in executing this new strategy due to their revolutionary identity, centralized organizations and expertise and readiness for violent action (Ishchenko 2020;Kudelia 2018;Likhachev 2015).…”

“…The volunteers' criticism of the state alone suggests that the war in Donbas did not witness the kind of merging of state and society recorded by Lederer. While some worried about the militarization of and anti-democratic tendencies in Ukraine (Ishchenko 2020), nationalists welcomed the war as a unifying force that would remove negative Soviet and Russian influence from Ukrainian society and mend cleavages within it (Karagiannis 2016, 144-46). Several first-generation Ukrainians who fought in the war explained how they only now felt the weight of their national identity (Mitchnik 2019).…”

Radicalisation, Foreign Fighters and the Ukraine Conflict: A Playground for the Far-Right?

“…The extant literature is divided over the importance of the far-right in Euromaidan, with some downplaying their role and others saying that their actions were more important than their numbers might suggest (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014;Katchanovski 2020;Ishchenko 2016Ishchenko , 2020. However significant their role overall, such actors were heavily involved during the revolution and participated in high-profile activities, even beyond Kyiv, with one such significant occurrence being the so-called 'Maidan Massacre', in which more than 100 people were killed.…”

Influential allies and grassroots movement mobilization: Ukraine’s Maidan, 2013–2014

“…These parties were a 'coalition of inconvenience' (Onuch, 2014b), where ambitious party leaders sought to satisfy their own interests. Disagreements inside the Euromaidan camp were a major reason why there were difficulties in deliberating on a tactical repertoire (Ishchenko, 2020).…”