Insufficient Effort Responding in Experimental Philosophy

Abstract

Providing valid responses to a self-report survey requires cognitive effort. Subjects engaging in insufficient effort responding (IER) are unwilling to take this effort. Compared to psychologists, experimental philosophers so far seem to have paid less attention to IER. This chapter is an attempt to begin to alleviate this shortcoming. First, it explains IER’s nature, prevalence and negative effects in self-report surveys in general. Second, it argues that IER might also affect experimental philosophy studies. Third, it develops recommendations as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to prevent IER. Fourth, it develops recommendations as to how experimental philosophers should (and should not) try to detect IER. Fifth, it sketches how experimental philosophers ought to proceed once a subject has been identified as an insufficient effort responder. And finally, the chapter reports the results of an online survey that addresses experimental philosophers’ current knowledge, consideration, and assessment of IER.