1989
DOI: 10.1017/s0022226700012147
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Instruments as agents: on the nature of semantic relations

Abstract: There is a widespread current assumption that the semantic relations underlying linguistic constructions reflect the way human beings ineluctably, and hence universally, perceive events and situations. This assumption will be questioned in this paper. To make the point, a linguistic construction purportedly expressing the instrumental case will be examined. It will be convenient here to juxtapose my treatment of this construction with the one proposed by case grammarians, and by Fillmore in particular. However… Show more

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Cited by 75 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…In (14), the use of a handle classifier was not acceptable in any context, according to the deaf informants. Following Schlesinger (1989), although instruments are not prototypical agents, they are the 'proximate causes of action ' (p. 193). Quite understandably, an instrument can be an extension of an agent, a 'co-causer' of an event, besides the volitional agent per se.…”
Section: Causative Predicates Involving Instruments and Natural Forcementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In (14), the use of a handle classifier was not acceptable in any context, according to the deaf informants. Following Schlesinger (1989), although instruments are not prototypical agents, they are the 'proximate causes of action ' (p. 193). Quite understandably, an instrument can be an extension of an agent, a 'co-causer' of an event, besides the volitional agent per se.…”
Section: Causative Predicates Involving Instruments and Natural Forcementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This property represents a departure from Dowty in that when instigation is entailed for an argument, it is only in relation to the event, not to any other argument, in contrast with the property 'causing an event or change of state in another participant'. This definition builds on discussions in Cruse (1973), Kearns (2000), Naess (2007) and Schlesinger (1989). Motion: Motion is entailed by a predicate just in case an argument is required to be in motion, which is most obviously the case with verbs of motion, such as come, descend, go or move, but also with verbs such as carry and take, or verbs of manner of motion such as run and walk.…”
Section: Participant Semanticsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…14 The argument linked to the e subevent introduced by -ish is assigned a general thematic role that subsumes both agents, causees, and instruments (Schlesinger 1989, Van Valin & Wilkins 1996, Croft 1991, Dowty 1991a, Rissman 2011. Following this work, I adopt a generalized thematic role (notationally: ag) as the label that subsumes agents, causers, and instruments.…”
Section: Caused Change-of-state Verbsmentioning
confidence: 99%