Instrumental and Constitutional Differentiation in the European Union

Abstract

Differentiation has become a salient feature of European integration. Yet systematic empirical evidence is lacking about its origins, duration and variation across countries and policies. This article provides such evidence from a new data set on differentiation in European Union treaty law. In addition, it is argued that two logics of treaty-based differentiation are at work. 'Instrumental differentiation' originates in enlargement and is motivated by efficiency and distributional concerns. 'Constitutional differentiation' has its origins in treaty revisions and is motivated by concerns about national sovereignty and identity. It is driven by Eurosceptic Member States that are opposed ideologically, or fear popular resistance, to the supranational centralization of core state powers.

The imbalance of capitalisms in the Eurozone: Can the north and south of Europe converge?

“…All of this could be overcome through a rebalancing of capitalisms within the Eurozone. But the heterogeneity and political interests of the social coalitions underpinning national labour and welfare institutions makes this highly unlikely (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012;Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2014). It would require Germany to inflate by 5.5 per cent per annum and Spain to deflate by a similar margin (see Hans-Werner, 2012).…”

More integration, less federation: the European integration of core state powers

“…Some scholars diagnose the rise of a 'new intergovernmentalism' that overlies and partly displaces the supranational actors and institutions of the traditional community method (Bickerton et al 2014). Others note the creeping territorial differentiation of EU integration: national opt-outs are an increasingly normal feature of EU policy-making (Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014). Yet others are concerned with the politicization of EU policies and institutions.…”

From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis of EU Governance: Regulatory Failure, Redistributive Conflict and Eurosceptic Publics

“…If this means ‘core Europe’, so be it. More likely, however, we should see more differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, ). Rather than excluding them altogether, Member States that prefer unilateralism over co‐operation on and compliance with EU policies and institutions should be given the opportunity to exit parts of the EU, such as Schengen or the euro.…”