Institutions versus lifestyle: do citizens have environmental duties in their private sphere?

Neuteleers, Stijn

doi:10.1080/09644016.2010.489702

Cited by 22 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Fairness : a collective scheme is the proper way to tackle collective action problems because cases of partial compliance are unfair to the compliers . Why should they make efforts when the others do not budge?…”

Section: Responsibility and Dutymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This purported amplifying effect (see Ref 5) of green behaviors can thus be viewed as a further justification for individual emission reductions, not for their own sake but instrumentally as a way to promote collective action. 6,8,20,29,30,34,72,108,109,111 However, the problem with such an argument is that it relies on empirical assumptions difficult to confirm about the communicative power of individual actions. It is easy to imagine that some public persons such as A-list celebrities or politicians might have an influence on lifestyle tendencies, but this is much harder to ascertain for average citizens.…”

Section: Changing Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Effectiveness: lifestyle changes can achieve only so much and responses to the climate challenge are bound to stay ineffective if the issue is not tackled (also) from the institutional side. It is so for various reasons including the facts that: (1) without binding regulations widespread noncompliance is to be expected; 3,15,84,[107][108][109] (2) insofar as a substantial part of the emissions is not under the control of individuals, the necessary cuts cannot be achieved without structural changes, even under the hypothesis of full compliance. 32,48,84,108 Efficiency: as we saw earlier, it can be very costly for individuals to reduce their carbon footprint depending on the circumstances in which they live.…”

Section: Changing Policies and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is also plausible that the social and psychological cost of giving up on some GHG intensive activities would be lower if everybody changed at the same time, and consequently new that this sacrifice is not 'useless.' 93,109 Fairness: a collective scheme is the proper way to tackle collective action problems because cases of partial compliance are unfair to the compliers. 8,94,109 Why should they make efforts when the others do not budge?…”

Section: Changing Policies and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Climate change and individual duties

Fragnière

2016

WIREs Climate Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Tackling climate change has often been considered the responsibility of national governments. But do individuals also have a duty to act in the face of this problem? In particular, do they have a duty to adopt a greener lifestyle or to press their government to act? This review critically examines the arguments provided for and against such duties in the relevant philosophic literature. It first discusses the problem of causal inefficacy—namely the fact that individual greenhouse gas emissions appear to make no difference to the harmful consequences of climate change—and whether it clears individuals from any moral obligations related to climate change. Then, it considers various other arguments for the existence of such duties, including integrity, fairness, universalizability, or virtue. Finally, it assesses the existence of a duty to promote collective action through active citizenship. The conclusion emphasizes that most writers agree on the fact that individuals have at least some duties to take action against climate change, but that disagreement remains about the exact nature and, above all, the extent of these duties. WIREs Clim Change 2016, 7:798–814. doi: 10.1002/wcc.422 This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Ethics and Climate Change

show abstract

Section: Responsibility and Dutymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Changing Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Changing Policies and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Changing Policies and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Climate change and individual duties

Fragnière

2016

WIREs Climate Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Climate change is a collective action problem, for which 'institutions are the well-known solution'. 62 Indeed, large-scale collective action problems cannot be solved by the isolated actions of even large numbers of individual persons. 63 In contrast, collective institutions have a great capacity to take measures regarding regulation, enforcement and coordination of climate action, and investment in renewable energy.…”

Section: No More Hiding Behind the Delegated Authority Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The delegated authority model misused as a strategy of disengagement in the case of climate change

Smet

Peeters

Sterckx

2016

Ethics & Global Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What [shall][should] we do? Why a binding climate treaty is in your interest

Hall

2017

WIREs Climate Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates whether and under what conditions a binding climate treaty can affect our individual moral obligations. Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong has argued that our sole moral obligation regarding climate change is to develop something like a binding treaty. On such an understanding, a binding agreement of the right type would absolve individuals of any further moral responsibilities to reduce carbon emissions. However, while something like this may be true in ideal circumstances of strict compliance, this paper argues that this is not the case in nonideal circumstances of partial compliance. The paper will proceed, first, by outlining the distinction between constitutive and nonconstitutive rules, or practice and summary rules, in Rawlsian terminology. I will then suggest that climate treaties, under the right circumstances, could fulfill the role of a practice with constitutive rules. If this is right, then the binding or nonbinding nature of a treaty (as well as the content of the treaty itself) could make it such that, under ideal circumstances, individuals have no obligation to reduce their carbon output beyond the requirements of the treaty. However, in the nonideal conditions of the actual world, the absence of full compliance to such institutions results in individual actions being subject to strict moral obligations. Consequently, it is in an individual's interest to enact such a binding treaty, at least insofar as they are at least somewhat concerned with fulfilling their moral obligations and would like to reduce the burdens of doing so. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e459. doi: 10.1002/wcc.459 This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Climate Change and Human Rights

show abstract

Institutions versus lifestyle: do citizens have environmental duties in their private sphere?

Cited by 22 publications

References 11 publications

Climate change and individual duties

Climate change and individual duties

The delegated authority model misused as a strategy of disengagement in the case of climate change

What [shall][should] we do? Why a binding climate treaty is in your interest

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About