Institutions for management of transboundary water resources: their nature, characteristics and shortcomings

Kliot, Nurit; Shmueli, Deborah F.; Shamir, Uri

doi:10.1016/s1366-7017(01)00008-3

Cited by 122 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…In their analysis of selected treaties, Kliot et al (2001) identify institutions for management of droughts in the Rio Grande (Bravo) shared by Mexico and the United States. The October 1995 Rio Grande treaty update provides for a standby water loan by the United States to Mexico in order to provide for unforeseen water needs of Mexican border communities along the river path.…”

Section: Legal and Institutional Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Management of Transboundary Water Resources under Scarcity

Dinar

Tsur

2015

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Section: Legal and Institutional Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Management of Transboundary Water Resources under Scarcity

Dinar

Tsur

2015

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“…These agencies are typically composed of Ecology and Society 18(2): 23 http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss2/art23/ several technocrats from each state along with an equal number of representatives from each party and are directed to establish water management plans, develop collaborative projects, monitor water levels and use, resolve conflicts, gather and disseminate data, build local capacity, and engage the public, among other duties. Joint commissions charged with addressing multiple collective action problems, such as water allocation and environmental conservation, face complex obstacles to their effectiveness, but many argue that integration of all related problems is required for efficacy, especially in addressing feedback (Kliot et al 2001, Dombrowsky 2007, Sadoff et al 2008. Others argue that a singular focus on optimizing for a particular outcome fails to retain the full range of ecosystem services (Walker andSalt 2006, Zellmer andGunderson 2009).…”

Section: Joint Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resilience in Transboundary Water Governance: the Okavango River Basin

Green¹,

Cosens²,

Garmestani³

2013

E&S

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ABSTRACT. When the availability of a vital resource varies between times of overabundance and extreme scarcity, management regimes must manifest flexibility and authority to adapt while maintaining legitimacy. Unfortunately, the need for adaptability often conflicts with the desire for certainty in legal and regulatory regimes, and laws that fail to account for variability often result in conflict when the inevitable disturbance occurs. Additional keys to resilience are collaboration among physical scientists, political actors, local leaders, and other stakeholders, and, when the commons is shared among sovereign states, collaboration between and among institutions with authority to act at different scales or with respect to different aspects of an ecological system. At the scale of transboundary river basins, where treaties govern water utilization, particular treaty mechanisms can reduce conflict potential by fostering collaboration and accounting for change. One necessary element is a mechanism for coordination and collaboration at the scale of the basin. This could be satisfied by mechanisms ranging from informal networks to the establishment of an international commission to jointly manage water, but a mechanism for collaboration at the basin scale alone does not ensure sound water management. To better guide resource management, study of applied resilience theory has revealed a number of management practices that are integral for adaptive governance. Here, we describe key resilience principles for treaty design and adaptive governance and then apply the principles to a case study of one transboundary basin where the need and willingness to manage collaboratively and iteratively is high-the Okavango River Basin of southwest Africa. This descriptive and applied approach should be particularly instructive for treaty negotiators, transboundary resource managers, and should aid program developers.

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“…Downstream countries can use their are largely confined to the word"s major river systems (Giannias and Lekakis, 1997;Kliot et al 2001) Some of these treaties and agreements are designed to allocate water between States (e.g. the Indus, Nile, Ganges and Jordan).…”

Section: International Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, in most cases, the basis for allocation between countries is mired in political and social history and reflects a political outcome rather than anything based on measurable criteria (Just and Netanyahu 1997). As a result, their main functions of these agreements tend to be maintaining the status quo, avoiding conflict, and providing a dispute settlement venue (Kliot et al 2001).…”

Section: International Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quota Allocation in International Fisheries

Cox

2009

OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers

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This paper explores issues relating to the process of allocating participatory rights in RFMOs, especially Executive SummaryDeveloping an allocation scheme for distributing rights amongst fishing nations is a key issue in the development of stable cooperative arrangements to exploit international fish resources. Allocation within regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) is generally based on the historical catches of parties to the RFMOs. However, as membership of RFMOs increases and pressure to allow additional countries, particularly coastal developing countries, to participate meaningfully in international fisheries intensifies, there is increasing policy attention being paid to the issue of allocation of rights in RFMOs.A great deal of effort has been devoted to finding a durable solution to the allocation question, both at the theoretical and at the applied level. Some of this effort has focused on the insights from game theory to identify the key factors underlying cooperative solutions. The basic requirement to promoting agreement amongst States is to ensure that no State is worse off in acting cooperatively than in acting inconsistently within an international cooperation framework. In the case of international fisheries, agreements must be self-enforcing to be stable as there is no third party to ensure enforcement of the agreement. Issues such as perceptions of fairness and equity in the initial allocation, new entrants, free-riders, optimal resource management in a multilateral setting, enforcement, and side payments (or "negotiation facilitators") have attracted much attention. This paper explores issues relating to the process of allocating participatory rights in RFMOs, especially in those cases in which one or more fisheries remain unallocated, and is intended to stimulate discussion among policy makers on possible policy directions in such situations without directly or indirectly evaluating existing allocation schemes. The paper reviews the international legal framework governing international fisheries, the economic issues underlying allocations, and the current state of play in the allocation regimes in RFMOs. A broader perspective on the allocation issue is provided by examining the experiences of other resource sectors that have wrestled policy challenges similar to those confronting international fisheries in allocating participatory rights amongst current and potential participants -water resources; and greenhouse gases -to see if they offer any transferable insights on the issue.The review of allocation experiences in other sectors provides a number of possible avenues that could be usefully explored in the debate on the allocation process in RFMOs. While, there is no unique solution due to the varied nature of RFMOs, there are sufficient common elements across RFMOs that allows some broad policy questions to be raised. Underlying these options is the question of whether there is a need for flexible mechanisms to achieve RFMO goals on participation and agreed process...

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Institutions for management of transboundary water resources: their nature, characteristics and shortcomings

Cited by 122 publications

References 20 publications

Management of Transboundary Water Resources under Scarcity

Management of Transboundary Water Resources under Scarcity

Resilience in Transboundary Water Governance: the Okavango River Basin

Quota Allocation in International Fisheries

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