Institutions as Signals: How Dictators Consolidate Power in Times of Crisis

Abstract

Formal institutions in dictatorship are known to improve authoritarian governance and promote power-sharing. Yet institutions also act as tools of information propagation and can be used by autocrats for signaling purposes. In this article, I argue that in times of weakness, dictators follow an expand-and-signal strategy, expanding the ruling coalition to decrease the relative power of coup plotters and then create visible formal institutions to signal strong support. Doing so decreases (1) the probability that a coup is launched and (2) that one succeeds if staged. I propose a formal model to unpack the mechanisms of my argument and use the case of the Dominican Republic during Rafael Trujillo's rule to illustrate my theory.

The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships

“…The attempt puts the dictator on full alert, which hinders any potential new plots and, especially, the element of surprise that coups require due to a higher risk of detection. But most importantly, while screening for loyalty can be difficult in political environments where there is a lack of transparency in elite interactions, the use of material inducements to buy loyalty and the use of repression to mute discontent create monitoring costs and impede observing the elites' real preferences and identify challengers (Sudduth and Bell 2018; Svolik 2012; Timoneda 2020); in the aftermath of a failed coup, internal opponents are exposed as coups force high-ranking officials and groups within the ruling coalition to make their preferences public and choose sides 7 . This improves the dictator's ability to out rivals and opposing factions (Powell, Chacha, and Smith 2018) and, in turn, exclude or eliminate them and weaken (if not eradicate) their organizational capacity (Bokobza et al 2022; Curtice and Arnon 2020; Easton and Siverson 2018).…”

“… 2 Most works have focused on explaining the creation of formal pseudo-democratic institutions; namely, legislatures, parties, and elections (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012). The existence of institutions is often assumed to signify the presence of effective constraints to the dictator's power, although they are, in fact, compatible (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Timoneda 2020). As for regime types, scholars have mostly focused on the emergence of military rule and the impact of internal and external conflict (Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2021; Kim 2019).…”

“… 10 Coups against strong leaders are likely to fail. While they may take place from time to time, the fact that they are launched is mostly due to ex-ante uncertainty about the leader's strength (Timoneda 2020). …”