Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract

Esser, John P.

doi:10.1086/492557

Cited by 5 publications

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“…It does not necessarily contradict other theories of business litigation. For example, recent empirical work has focused on the dominant mode of contracting in specific industries (Esser 1996). An emphasis on the importance of contract and exchange norms is wholly complementary to the theory presented here.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite the mix of reasonable theoretical arguments that suggest otherwise, litigation between firms is not a rarity. This empirical regularity has resulted in a renewed interest in the study of interfirm conflict and business litigation (Dunworth and Rogers 1996;Kenworthy, Macaulay, and Rogers 1996;Esser 1996). The evolving field demonstrates the continued importance of economic context, contract norms, and the existence of ongoing business relations as factors in the decision for firms to resort to litigation (Kaufman and Stem 1989).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…The current literature tends to emphasize either aggregate trends (Dunworth and Rogers 1996) or industry specific study (Macaulay 1963;Esser 1996;Kenworthy, Macaulay, and Rogers 1996). Both these methods have resulted in useful insights into the phenomenon of business disputing and litigation; however, such methods make cross-industry comparison difficult.6 Because litigation between firms is rooted in economic activity, understanding the relationship between industry divisions and disputing behavior is critical.…”

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confidence: 99%

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When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation

Cheit¹,

Gersen²

2000

Law soc. inq.

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Using a mixture of court docket data and case files, we construct a data set of business litigation in Rhode Island Superior Court during 1987 and 1988. Business litigation is defined as a suit involving an economic firm as both a plaintiff and a defendant. The empirical analysis complements recent scholarship providing answers to descriptive questions about the frequency, nature of, parties to, and intensity of the business litigation docket. Using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, indicators of industry participation in litigation are developed, and positive analysis undertaken to explain variation across industries. Several hypothesis are developed and tested using quantitative analysis. We conclude that contextual economic conditions favoring the creation of long‐term business relationships help prevent litigation between firms.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation

Cheit¹,

Gersen²

2000

Law soc. inq.

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“…Admittedly, neither relationalists nor artifactualists have devoted much attention to judicial behavior either; however, in these latter branches of contract scholarship, this omission is somewhat less glaring, since neither relationalism nor artifactualism has many pretensions about predicting (or prescribing) judicial outcomes. social-scientifically inclined researchers, as exemplified by the classic works of Stewart Macaulay (1963) and Ian Macneil (1974Macneil ( , 1980, as well as by the more recent works of Mark Granovetter (1985), Brian Uzzi (1996), and other economic sociologists (e.g., Lindenberg 1988;Esser 1996; see also Ellickson 1991;Bernstein 1992). Although studies in this tradition vary widely, they share a common emphasis on the careful ethnographic observation of how real-world actors govern real-world exchanges, with a particular focus on interorganizational relations in stable business communities.…”

Section: Terms and Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contract as Social Artifact

Suchman¹

2003

Law Soc Rev

121

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This article outlines a distinctive, albeit not entirely unprecedented, research agenda for the sociolegal study of contracts. In the past, law and society scholars have tended to examine contracts either through the intellectual history of contract doctrine “on the books” or through the empirical study of how real‐world exchange relations are governed “in action.” Although both of these traditions have contributed greatly to our understanding of contract law, neither has devoted much attention to the most distinctive concrete product of contractual transactions—contract documents themselves. Without denying the value of studying either contract doctrine or relational governance, this article argues that contract documents are independently interesting social artifacts and that they should be studied as such. As social artifacts, contracts possess both technical and symbolic properties, and the sociolegal study of contract‐as‐artifact can profitably apply prevailing social scientific theories of technology and symbolism to understand both: (1) the microdynamics of why and how transacting parties craft individual contract devices, and (2) the macrodynamics of why and how larger social systems generate and sustain distinctive contract regimes. Seen in this light, the microdynamics of contract implicate “technical” theories of transaction cost engineering and private lawmaking, and “symbolic” theories of ceremony and gesture. In a parallel fashion, the macrodynamics of contract implicate “technical” theories of innovation diffusion, path dependence, and technology cycles, and “symbolic” theories of ideology, legitimacy, and communication. Together, these micro and macro explorations suggest that contract artifacts may best be understood as scripts and signals—collections of symbols designed to yield technically efficacious practical action when interpreted by culture‐bearing social actors within the context of preexisting vocabularies and conventions.

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“…As a result, preserving the business relationship receives priority over winning the conflict. Most game theoretic models that highlight the potential of repeated interaction to engender cooperative behavior lend support to the general proposition.1 Recently, a number of articles have followed in the Macaulay tradition (Esser 1996;Kenworthy, Macaulay, and Rogers 1996). In general, they provide support for Macaulay's original conclusions.…”

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Markets and Corporate Conflict: A Substitution-Cost Approach to Business Litigation

Gersen¹

1999

Law & Social Inquiry

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This paper examines the phenomenon of conflict escalation in business relations. A theory of when conflict between firms will proceed from informal relationship-preserving norms to more f o m l and destructive end games involwing litigation is developed and tested. The central theoretical claim is that substitution costs serve as an impediment against the escalation of conflict. Data on market concentration and dollar flows between aggregate markets in the economy are used to develop measures of substitution costs. Measures of substitution costs and trade figures are also used to describe power advantages in markets. The theory is tested through a series of regression models. The main findings are that (1) when substitution costs are high, parties are kss likely to escalate confZict and (2) asymmetric market relations result in less confict escalation than symmetric ones. Empirical analysis indicates that substitution costs are related in predictable and meaningful ways to conflict escalation and business litigation.For scholars who study conflict behavior, relationships between economic firms provide a particularly fertile ground for research. Precisely because economic firms are quintessential rational actors, the way firms ~~ Jacob E.

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Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation

When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation

The Contract as Social Artifact

Markets and Corporate Conflict: A Substitution-Cost Approach to Business Litigation

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