Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and historical benchmarks

Melecký, Martin; Podpiera, Anca Maria

doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2013.03.003

Cited by 43 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This complements the findings in Melecky and Podpiera (2013) who identify a series of determinants of unified financial sector supervision. In this paper, we focus on the determinants of a unified supervision, but in the hands of the central bank.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 81%

“…Specifically, higher central bank independence is associated with a lower central bank involvement in supervision. Thus, not only does higher independence suggest more decentralised supervision as Melecky and Podpiera (2013) find, but also less involvement of central banks in the oversight of the financial sector. This is in line with the view that granting the unified supervisory power to an already highly independent central bank might increase the risk of bureaucratic misconduct (Masciandaro, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…The different levels of integration assumed by this index are based on previous measures of financial sector supervision proposed in Masciandaro (2006Masciandaro ( , 2009 and Melecky and Podpiera (2013). We extend these indicators in several ways.…”

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Metrics And Stylised Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Masciandaro and Quintyn (2015) highlight two conflicting views regarding the merger of monetary and supervisory functions inside the central bank. An integration view underscores the informational advantages and economies of scale derived from bringing all functions under the authority of the central bank (Peek et al, 1999;Bernanke, 2007). Alternatively, a separation argument highlights the higher risk of policy failure, as financial stability concerns might impede the implementation of optimal monetary policies (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995;Ioannidou, 2005;Berger and Kißmer, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, limiting the concept of supervision solely to the banking sector overlooks the interplay between banks, insurance companies and financial markets, as well as the supervisory challenges posed by international financial conglomerates (De Grauwe, 2008). Second, when the entire financial sector is considered, as in Melecky and Podpiera (2013), the focus has been on whether the supervision is unified or under the control of separate institutions. At difference, in this paper, we are concerned with the increasing role of the central bank in supervision.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Central bankers as supervisors: Do crises matter?

Masciandaro

Romelli

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Global Financial Crisis many countries have changed their financial supervisory architecture by increasing the involvement of central banks in supervision. This has led many scholars to argue that financial crises are an important driver in explaining the evolution of the role of central banks as supervisors. We formally test this hypothesis employing a new database that captures the full set of supervisory reforms implemented during the period 1996-2013 in a large sample of countries. Our findings support the view that systemic banking crises are important drivers of reforms in supervisory structure. However, we also highlight an equally important peer effect, namely a tendency of countries to reform their financial supervisory architecture when others do so as well. We construct several measures of spatial spillover effects and show that they can explain institutional similarities among countries and impact the probability of reforming the role of the central bank in financial sector supervision.

show abstract

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 81%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 73%