1994
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818300028307
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Institutional selection in international relations: state anarchy as order

Abstract: By the end of the medieval era, three new competing institutions attempted to capture gains from trade and reduce feudal particularism: sovereign territorial states, cityleagues, and city-states. By the middle of the seventeenth century, city-leagues and city-states had declined markedly. Territorial states survived as the dominant form because they were able to reduce free riding, lower transaction costs, and credibly commit their constituents. The selection process took place along three dimensions. First, s… Show more

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Cited by 134 publications
(55 citation statements)
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“…Lake (1996) builds on NEO to present a theory of contracting whereby organizational choice in security relations -which varies on a continuum from anarchic alliances to hierarchic empires -is determined by considerations of transaction costs and the risk of opportunism. Other political scientists have explained the institution of state sovereignty through this lens (Spruyt, 1994;Cooley and Spruyt, 2009). International lawyers have similarly applied transaction costs economics to explain variation in legal institutions (Aceves, 1996;Trachtman, 1997).…”
Section: Institutional Variation and Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lake (1996) builds on NEO to present a theory of contracting whereby organizational choice in security relations -which varies on a continuum from anarchic alliances to hierarchic empires -is determined by considerations of transaction costs and the risk of opportunism. Other political scientists have explained the institution of state sovereignty through this lens (Spruyt, 1994;Cooley and Spruyt, 2009). International lawyers have similarly applied transaction costs economics to explain variation in legal institutions (Aceves, 1996;Trachtman, 1997).…”
Section: Institutional Variation and Designmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…13 See Ertman (2005) for a discussion. For examples, see for instance the accounts of Anderson (1974); Ertman (1997); Mann (1997) Spruyt (1994);and van Creveld (1999).…”
Section: States As Engines Of Exploitationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…13 See Ertman (2005) for a discussion. For examples, see for instance the accounts of Anderson (1974);Ertman (1997);Mann (1997) Spruyt (1994 and van Creveld (1999).Theor Soc (2016) 45:57-88 61 Yes Minister: it has a fully developed and functional administration, but no patients. It has a bureaucracy, it is a place, but there are no people.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jinými slovy řečeno, státní aktéři "sdílejí normy jednoduše proto, že si myslí, že je to správné a legitimní" [33]. Takovou základní normou je na kulturní bázi konstituovaný institut suverenity, kdy "jeden stát se zdráhá vměšovat do záležitostí státu druhého" [34]. Státy tak můžeme považovat za sociálně zodpovědné entity nadřazující "kolektivní zájmy nad své vlastní" [35], akceptující sociálně konstruované normy a sdílející porozumění v rámci mezinárodního společenství/světové společnosti.…”
Section: Mezinárodní Anarchie a Způsoby Její Regulaceunclassified