Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790

Sussman, Nathan; Yafeh, Yishay

doi:10.1017/s0022050706000374

Cited by 125 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…On the state's ability to commit, it is important to keep in mind that in some cases of state effectiveness commitment has not 22 On this, see also Hoppit (2011) and Sussman and Yafeh (2006). 23 Outside England, across early modern Europe, Stasavage (2011) cites evidence of how the government's ability to raise long-term credit depended on assemblies where merchant representatives looking after lenders' interests had some political control over fiscal affairs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

Bardhan

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

192

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This essay tries to bring out some of the complexities that are overlooked in the usual treatment of the state in the institutional economics literature and supplement the latter with a discussion of some alternative approaches to looking at the possible developmental role of the state. It refers to a broader range of development goals (including the structural transformation of the economy) and focuses on problems like the resolution of coordination failures and collective-action problems, the conflicting issues of commitment and accountability and the need for balancing the trade-offs they generate, some ingredients of state capacity and political coalition building usually missed in the literature, the possible importance of rent sharing in a political equilibrium, the advantages and problems of political centralization and decentralization, and the multidimensionality of state functions that may not be addressed by markets or private firms. (JEL D72, H11, H77, K00, O17, O43, P26)

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

Bardhan

2016

Journal of Economic Literature

192

109

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Most analyses of financial statistics have also failed to detect significant improvements in the business environment or investment climate after 1688 (see e.g. Clark, 1996;Epstein, 2000;Quinn, 2001;Stasavage, 2002;Sussman and Yafeh, 2006) (Allen, 2006). The absence of such kinds of discontinuity seemingly gives support to scholars (e.g.…”

Section: F) Institutional and Political Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Did the Industrial Revolution Start in Britain?

Neuss

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The main goal of this paper is to provide an integrated overview of the literature devoted to identifying the causes of the British industrial revolution. Why did the industrial revolution, a fascinating and multifaceted event which brought about modern economic growth, occur in eighteenth-century Britain? This question has animated a lot of discussions among scholars and is still nowadays heatedly debated in the literature. This debate is reflected in the large spectrum of theories which aim at explaining the true origins of the British industrialization. The paper first sheds light on a rising debate concerning the evolution of British incomes per capita before the British industrial revolution and the "Great Divergence". The paper then investigates the proposed causes of the British industrialization, aggregating them into seven broad categories, i.e. (1) geography and natural resources, (2) demography, (3) agricultural progress, (4) demand-side factors, (5) trade and empire, (6) institutional and political factors, (7) science, technology, and human capital.

show abstract

“…5 There is a large literature on England's Financial Revolution (see Dickson, 1967;Tomlinson, 1979;North and Weingast, 1989;Rosevere, 1991;Hart, 1991;Carruthers, 1996;Quinn, 2001;Stasavage, 2002;Sussman and Yafeh, 2006). In linking the Financial Revolution to the Industrial Revolution that followed a century later we are implicitly following North and Weingast (1989) and Pincus and Robinson (2011).…”

Section: French and English Tax Systems In 1500mentioning

confidence: 99%

Standardizing the Fiscal State: Cabal Tax Farming as an Intermediate Institution in Early-Modern England and France

Johnson

Koyama

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How did modern and centralized fiscal institutions emerge? We develop a model that explains (i) why pre-industrial states relied on private individuals to collect taxes; (ii) why after 1600 both England and France moved from competitive methods for collecting revenues to allocating the right to collect taxes to a small group of financiers-a intermediate institution that we call cabal tax farming--and (iii) why this centralization led to investments in fiscal capacity and increased fiscal standardization. We provide detailed historical evidence that supports our prediction that rulers abandoned the competitive allocation of tax rights in favor of cabal tax farming in order to gain access to inside credit and that this transition was accompanied by investments in standardization. Finally (iv) we show why this intermediate institution proved to be self-undermining in England where it was quickly replaced by direct collection, but lasted in France until the French Revolution.

show abstract

Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790

Cited by 125 publications

References 11 publications

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature

Why Did the Industrial Revolution Start in Britain?

Standardizing the Fiscal State: Cabal Tax Farming as an Intermediate Institution in Early-Modern England and France

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About