Institutional proximity and judicial corruption: A spatial approach

Juan, Wang; Liu, Sida

doi:10.1111/gove.12594

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…A study by Gong (2004) also drew a similar conclusion, arguing that judicial corruption is a systemic disease in China. Wang and Liu (2021) used the spatial theory of institutional proximity to explain institutional causes of judicial corruption in China and found that the proximity between political or social institutions causes judicial corruption. The lack of funds is also an important cause of judicial corruption in China.…”

Section: Theoretic Framework: What Conditions Affect Citizens’ Judici...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do people choose courts to resolve disputes? A fuzzy-set analysis of Chinese citizens’ judicial reliance

Guo²,

Lyu³

et al. 2023

Front. Psychol.

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We use the concept of judicial reliance to describe the willingness and extent to which citizens seek the help of the court in a dispute. There are obvious local differences in the degree of judicial reliance in different provinces, with some citizens more willing to resort to the courts to settle disputes, whereas others are indifferent to the courts. Based on the judicial survey data of 31 provinces in China, we use fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to explore the possible reasons for differences in citizens’ judicial reliance in China. We find that citizens’ judicial reliance is deeply influenced and restricted by five judicial conditions: transparency, corruption, independence, procedure, and professionalism. These causal conditions influence and interact with each other, thus forming six configurations that produce high judicial reliance. Among these six configurations, judicial professionalism is always the core condition. In recent years, China has indeed attached great importance to the construction of judicial professionalism, which not only optimizes the quality of the internal personnel of the court but also strengthens the public’s recognition of the court.

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Section: Theoretic Framework: What Conditions Affect Citizens’ Judici...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do people choose courts to resolve disputes? A fuzzy-set analysis of Chinese citizens’ judicial reliance

Guo²,

Lyu³

et al. 2023

Front. Psychol.

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“…Nevertheless, the subordination of the legal system to the CCP is undisputed among sociolegal scholars (Biddulph, 2015;Clarke, 2020;Fu, 2016;He, 2016b;He & Ng, 2017;Liebman, 2007;Liu, 2021;Lubman, 1999;Minzner, 2011;Nesossi & Trevaskes, 2017;Stern, 2013;Wang & Liu, 2021). Chinese criminal courts operate in an inquisitorial system.…”

Section: The Context: Chinese Criminal Courtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Face-work in Chinese routine criminal trials

2023

Law Soc Rev

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This article examines the performative aspect of face‐to‐face interactions among various legal actors and defendants in routine criminal trials in China. Using 105 trial videos as empirical data, the author develops a face‐work framework to understand how an individual judge's “face”—signifying judges' legal and political roles, and their professional status—is established, protected, and enhanced during courtroom interactions. The study shows that the legal face of judges can be established by some characterizations of the nature of criminal trials such as the demarcation of legal space, the speed of the trial, and the apprising of rights to the defendants. Nevertheless, the legal face can also be disrupted by trial interactions due to judges' lack of judicial authority. Hence, Chinese judges maintain their authority through the establishment of their political face. They also use both their political face and legal face to establish their situational professional status. These interactions often lead to punitive and coercive measures against defendants in trials. While the article focuses on routine criminal trials in China, the face‐work framework has the potential to explain courtroom interactions in other types of social contexts and legal proceedings.

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“…The first is, because agencification is frequently directly associated with processes of geographical relocation, that is, moving agencies physically from the capital where government ministries reside, towards peripheral cities. Arguments for relocating have been to reduce corrupt behavior by increasing social distances between principals and actors, to smooth regional inequality by moving high competence jobs outside the capital, to reduce budgets by moving civil servants to less costly locations, and to unclog the larger cities through decreasing commuting to the center of the capital (Economist, 2019;Jeon andLee, 2021, Faggio, 2019;Marshall et al, 2005;Wang and Liu, 2022). Geographical location and relocation of government institutions also tend to mobilize more attention and resistance from stakeholders than, for example, (re)organizing such institutions (Meyer and Stensaker, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional geography: effects of physical distance on agency autonomy

Jacobsen

Trondal

2023

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Establishing government agencies outside ministerial departments is frequently justified by a need to safeguard agency autonomy. In addition to ‘formal agencification’, that is, erecting formal barriers between agencies and ministries, agencies are also frequently (re)located physically distant from ministries to both signal and strengthen agency autonomy. However, we know little of the effects of physical location and distance on agency autonomy. Using two large surveys from 2006 and 2016, this study examines how geographical location and distance affect agency autonomy. Our study establishes that agency autonomy is only weakly associated with physical location and distance, and is much less important than political salience. Whereas a conventional claim is that agency autonomy may be strengthened by physically (re)locating agencies at arm's length distance from the core executive, our study suggests that physical (re)location represents an ineffective administrative policy design-tool when applied to agency autonomy. Points for practitioners Physical distance between agencies and parent ministries is only remotely associated with agency autonomy. Physical location thus represents an ineffective design-tool if the purpose is to increase agency autonomy

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Institutional proximity and judicial corruption: A spatial approach

Cited by 8 publications

References 57 publications

Why do people choose courts to resolve disputes? A fuzzy-set analysis of Chinese citizens’ judicial reliance

Why do people choose courts to resolve disputes? A fuzzy-set analysis of Chinese citizens’ judicial reliance

Face-work in Chinese routine criminal trials

Institutional geography: effects of physical distance on agency autonomy

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