2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.06.001
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Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting

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Cited by 226 publications
(120 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
(20 reference statements)
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“…Hence, in the context of equity issues, the monitoring hypothesis implies that postissue changes in stock price would be positively related to the contemporaneous changes in total and active institutional ownership. Third, since the incentive and ability of institutions to monitor management increases with the concentration of ownership, we would expect a positive relation between post-issue performance and contemporaneous changes in ownership concentration (Burns et al, 2010).…”
Section: The Monitoring Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, in the context of equity issues, the monitoring hypothesis implies that postissue changes in stock price would be positively related to the contemporaneous changes in total and active institutional ownership. Third, since the incentive and ability of institutions to monitor management increases with the concentration of ownership, we would expect a positive relation between post-issue performance and contemporaneous changes in ownership concentration (Burns et al, 2010).…”
Section: The Monitoring Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bushee (1998) observe que leur présence comme actionnaires limite les décisions opportunistes des dirigeants de réduction des dépenses de recherche et développement. Il semble donc que ces investisseurs exercent un rôle particulier de contrôle sur les dirigeants, comme le constatent également Chung et al (2002), Velury et Jenkins (2006), et Burns et al (2010).…”
Section: L'actionnariat Financier Et Les Investisseurs Institutionnelsunclassified
“…Cependant, Bushee (1998) et Burns et al (2010) notent que l'impact des investisseurs institutionnels est d'autant moins fort que ces institutionnels sont des investisseurs de passage. Dans le contexte australien, Koh (2003) et Hsu et Koh (2005) montrent qu'il existe une relation non linéaire entre la gestion des résultats et la part détenue par les investisseurs institutionnels, leur effet bénéfique n'apparaissant qu'à partir d'un certain niveau de détention (50 % environ).…”
Section: L'actionnariat Financier Et Les Investisseurs Institutionnelsunclassified
“…Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs (2009) show that share price responses for firms accused with misconduct correlate with subsequent changes in the level of certainty about earnings. The number of analysts declines significantly after a restatement (Griffin, 2003), as does institutional ownership (Burns et al, 2010). On a similar note, Hegde et al (2010) find that trading volume drops significantly in the long term after a fraud disclosure leading to a securities fraud class action.…”
Section: Market Measures Of Fraudmentioning
confidence: 92%