Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review

Abstract

We provide a review of the literature surrounding institutional investor classifications, and we extend this research by examining the aforementioned classification systems and relate this to the three predominant financial systems (market-based, family-centred, and bank-centred systems). After integrating this literature we propose that future research can contribute to the corporate governance field in three main ways: through improved measurement of the central constructs, through more complex research designs (through moderated and/or longitudinal relationships), and through asking new types of questions. We suggest several questions and approaches for future research on institutional investors and their interrelationship with country financial systems. Copyright (c) 2010 The Authors. Journal of Management Studies (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies.

Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria: An accountability perspective

“…The difference between small and large individual shareholders is attributable to the size of their shareholdings which influences their approach to, and effectiveness of, shareholder activism (Connell et al, 2010;Crespi and Renneboog, 2010;Johnson et al, 2010). Small individual shareholders on their own face the disadvantage of having a weak influence over management because of their small voting rights.…”

Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis

“…In particular, research has established that dispersed ownership is not widespread but that concentrated ownership is far more prevalent in the region with majority owners, such as entrepreneur-founders and their families, frequently being involved in firm management (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). A growing body of work suggests that concentrated ownership surfaces and persists in Asia because it permits owners to perform several value-creating governance functions in a context where governance mechanisms external to the firm, such as legal protection and the market for corporate control, are absent (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010;Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2011;Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010). In particular, concentrated owners who are actively involved in the firm's strategic management may be viewed as "monitors in place" (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009) where they can observe executive behavior and exert strong influence over it.…”

Information Asymmetry, Disclosure and Foreign Institutional Investment: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

“…Despite the globalization of the markets, we have not yet achieved a convergence of government practices and corporate disclosure policies (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003;Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010;García-Sánchez, Rodríguez-Ariza, & Frías-Aceituno, 2013). It appears that each time a new regulatory regime is introduced in a country its effects can be quite idiosyncratic, with significant implications on international investment and business.…”