Institutional hokey-pokey: the politics of multispeed integration in the European Union

On the Methodology of Studying Differentiated (Dis)integration: Or How the Potential Outcome Framework Can Contribute to Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Opting In or Out

“…Kroll and Leuffen (), again using qualitative case studies, back Kölliker's expectations using a large sample related to the enhanced cooperation procedure. Jensen and Slapin () provide another exception to the general observation that there is a lack of studies on the effects of differentiated integration. These authors formulate a game theoretical model that provides insights on possible cascading effects and probe their model's plausibility with short case studies.…”

Why differentiated integration is such a common practice in Europe: A rational explanation

“…Finally, and most relevant for the governments representing the member states in the negotiations, the direct and administrative costs can turn into political costs. If lobby groups from the private sector or public officials oppose further integration, this might influence opposition parties (see, e.g., Sandholtz, 1993) or the general public (see, e.g., Jensen and Slapin, 2012). Consequently, the government faces loss of public support, future vote loss, or even legislative defeat if the opposition comes from true veto players.…”

“…European integration has been accompanied by debates on differentiated integration (DI). Notions such as 'multi-speed' Europe, 'flexible integration', 'unity in diversity', or 'core Europe' have emerged, all of which share the idea that the member states integrate to different degrees with the European Union (EU) (e.g., Dyson and Sepos, 2010;Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012;Hvidsten and Hovi, 2015;Jensen and Slapin, 2012;Leuffen et al, 2013;Schneider, 2009). The European Monetary Union (EMU) represents the most prominent case of DI: while some member states refused to participate, others were not permitted to join the club (see, e.g., Sandholtz, 1993).…”

Eastern enlargement and differentiated integration: towards normalization

“…According to the basic story in the literature (see, e.g., Dyson & Sepos 2010: : 5-6;Jensen & Slapin 2012;Kölliker 2006;Leuffen et al 2013;Majone 2009: : 221), differentiated integration is best understood as an institutional response to the increasing heterogeneity of member state preferences (willingness) and capacities (ability) resulting from both the widening and the deepening of the EU. Willingness consists in having an interest in participating in the internal market and the common policies of the EU, and in being prepared to transfer state competences to the supranational level.…”