Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics

Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination

“…5 It turns out that both types of dynamics (two-population or one-population) yield exactly the same results regarding the characterization of stationary states and asymptotically stable states. This has been shown formally in the related setup of bestexperienced payoff-sampling dynamics (Sethi, 2000, Thoerem 3;Arigapudi et al, 2021, Corollary 2), and these proofs can be adapted to the current setup. Thus all of our results remain valid for symmetric coordination games played within a single population.…”

Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning

“…This weak assumption holds in many dynamics, such as better reply dynamics (Hart, 2002;Arieli and Young, 2016), and best reply dynamics (Hwang and Newton, 2017;Babichenko, 2018;Sawa and Zusai, 2019). The few models that violate Weak payoff positivity include action-sampling dynamics (Sandholm, 2001;Oyama et al, 2015;Arigapudi et al, 2022) and payoff-sampling dynamics (Sethi, 2000;Sandholm et al, 2020;Arigapudi et al, 2021). 4 Our notion of multi-dimensional learning should not be confused with Arieli and Mueller-Frank's (2019) different use of the same phrase.…”

Strategy Sets Closed Under Payoff Sampling

“…This equilibrium has been named payoff-sampling equilibrium in the literature (see e.g. Selten and Chmura (2008), Chmura and Güth (2011), Cárdenas et al (2015), Sethi (2021) and Arigapudi et al (2021Arigapudi et al ( , 2022). When defining this equilibrium, most authors (e.g.…”

“…Procedurally rational agents and their associated payoff-sampling equilibria have been used in a variety of applications, including consumer choice procedures and product pricing strategies (Spiegler, 2006a), markets with asymmetric information (Spiegler, 2006b), trust and delegation of control (Rowthorn and Sethi, 2008), the Traveler's Dilemma (Berkemer, 2008), market entry (Chmura and Güth, 2011), ultimatum bargaining (Mie ¸kisz and Ramsza, 2013), use of common-pool resources (Cárdenas et al, 2015), contributions to public goods (Mantilla et al, 2020), the Centipede game (Sandholm et al, 2019;Izquierdo and Izquierdo, 2022b), the Prisoner's Dilemma (Arigapudi et al, 2021), coordination problems (Izquierdo et al, 2022), and finitely repeated games (Sethi, 2021). Sethi (2000) introduced population dynamics based on the considered procedurally rational agents.…”

“…Mie ¸kisz and Ramsza (2013); Mantilla et al (2020)) and payoff-sampling dynamics (see e.g. Sethi (2021); Arigapudi et al (2021Arigapudi et al ( , 2022), take the form ẋi = w κ i (x) − x i ,…”