Insider Trading in Israel and England, Part I.

Abstract

It is generally assumed that English directors have acarte blancheprivilege to engage at arm's length in transactions involving securities of a corporation which they manage. Thus directors of English corporations may utilize inside information for their personal benefit at the expense of their trading partners. This assumption is derived from the calamitous decision ofPercivalv.Wrightwhich, subject to illusory limitations imposed byAllenv.Hyatt, is still believed to be the law in England today. Israeli directors, it is believed, share thiscarte blancheprivilege with their English counterparts. This belief derives from the fact that Israeli courts resort to English jurisprudence, when necessary to fill in the gaps which are found to exist in Israeli law.This paper questions the validity of the above assumptions. It is an attempt to evaluate whether or not an English or Israeli director, or another insider, may indeed utilize inside information to trade in the securities of his corporation without regard to rules governing fiduciary relationships and other legal principles, which, it is submitted, the English judiciary and bar have thus far overlooked.

The Current Rights of Minority Shareholders in Saudi Arabia

“…Board members' fiduciary duty requires them to fully disclose to the board and shareholders any information such a member has provided that led to any form of personal gain. 107 According to the CML, insider information has not been disclosed to the public but is obtained by an individual with legitimate internal access to the firm. If such information were released to the public in an untimely manner, it would have a material effect on the market price of securities.…”