Inquiry and confirmation

Abstract

A puzzle arises when combining two individually plausible, yet jointly incompatible, norms of inquiry. On the one hand, it seems that one should not inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. But, on the other hand, it seems rational to inquire into a question while believing its answer, if one is seeking confirmation. Millson (2021), who has recently identified this puzzle, suggests a possible solution, though he notes that it comes with significant costs. I offer an alternative solution, which does not involve these costs. The best way to resolve the puzzle is to reject the prohibition on inquiring into a question while believing an answer to it. Resolving the puzzle in this way makes salient two fruitful areas in the epistemology of inquiry that merit further investigation. The first concerns the nature of the inquiring attitudes and the second concerns the aim(s) of inquiry. Keywords: inquiry, confirmation, norms of inquiry, inquiring attitudes, aims

Questioning and addressee knowledge

“…2 Recent work on the norms of inquiry includes: Whitcomb (2017); Friedman (2019bFriedman ( ,a, 2020; Millson (2020); Falbo (2021); Thorstad (2021); McGrath (2021); van Elswyk and Sapir (2021); Woodard (2022).…”

Why Double-Check?

“…11 Note that this list need not be exhaustive. Perhaps agents can inquire to increase the accuracy of their credence (Falbo 2021) or to attain understanding why p holds, assuming that understanding why p can go beyond knowledge that p. See Kelp (2021) for one recent discussion of the relationships between understanding, knowledge, and inquiry. 12 See Dutant (2016) for a recent defense of infallibilism.…”

“…This proposal also faces serious burdens, as he indicates. I am sympathetic to Falbo's (2021) response to the puzzle he articulates. 40 See, for instance, Friedman (2017: 309-10).…”

Checking and the Argument from Inquiry

“…Another possible explanation of the oddity of (1)-( 3) and ( 7)-( 9) is that knowledge is the most commonplace goal of inquiry. Typically, knowing the answer is enough to settle the questions we are interested in, and, of the many things that 17 Against the Ignorance Norm, Falbo (2021) argues that confirming that p is compatible with knowing that p, Woodard (Forthcoming) defends the rationality of double checking while knowing, and Beddor (manuscript) points out that inquiry can be aimed at becoming certain that p.…”