Inputs from Philosophy to Cognitive Science: the Example of L-concepts and the Suppression Task

Abstract

Although it is many times said that progress can be observed in none of the different subfields that are part of philosophy, this paper is intended to show otherwise by means of an example. That example is based upon the L-concepts that are introduced by Carnap in his method of extension and intension, and it refers to the idea that the underlying machinery of this last method is able to solve problems such as those that reasoning exercises such as the suppression task raise in the cognitive science field nowadays. As it is accounted for, the key is to assume that the human mind is somehow linked to state-descriptions akin to those proposed by Carnap.

The suppression task and first‐order predicate calculus

“…The essential idea of this approach is that people might think considering state‐descriptions. Although the theory of mental models rejects proposals of this kind (e.g., Khemlani et al, 2017), this framework is presented as an account close to the theory of mental models (López‐Astorga, 2020). From this perspective, when individuals reason about (1), they think about only one state‐description.…”

“…Beyond that the clauses in the theory of mental models are not logical formulae, the number of clauses is not comparable either. The two approaches are not easily reconcilable (for arguments similar to these ones and further explanations related to this approach, see López‐Astorga, 2020).…”

“…Several accounts of this issue have been given. The first part of the present paper will indicate the general theses of three of them (they are only three examples, since the list of approaches is long): that based on the theory of mental models (e.g., Byrne, 1989; Byrne et al, 1999; Espino & Byrne, 2020), that adopting logic programming and closed world assumption (e.g., Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2005), and that referring to Carnap's (1947) concept of state‐description (López‐Astorga, 2020). The second part will present a new solution taking into account Carnap's (1936, 1937) idea of reduction.…”

“…One more example of account of the suppression task is that based on state‐descriptions (López‐Astorga, 2020). State‐description is the expression Carnap (1947) uses to mean ‘possible world’ (as the latter is understood in modal logic).…”

“…According to Carnap (1947), a formula is L‐true when, following the Kantian philosophy, it is analytic. ‘If a formula, or a sentence, is L‐true, or analytic, it is evident that it is also true in all of the possible worlds one can suppose, that is, in all state‐descriptions’ (López‐Astorga, 2020, p. 3). (13) is not L‐true.…”