Innovative Experiences in Access to Finance: Market-Friendly Roles for the Visible Hand?

Abstract

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Nothing herein shall constitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.

Financial integration and macroeconomic sustainability: a sector approach to access to finance and the pre-crisis growth model

“…Nevertheless, the idea of the state action in helping the access to finance of the private sector in developing countries is not novel or unconsidered. Yet, the recent empirical analysis and discussion papers are rather in favor of some kind of soft state intervention ('visible hand') in the form of rules and regulation that promote, indirectly, the access to finance opaque in terms of information, but still valuable projects (De la Torre, 2007).…”

The Rise of Domestic Capital Markets for Corporate Financing

“…To study the types of firms issuing in domestic and international markets over time, we focus on size. We follow the literature that typically uses firm size or collateral to measure financial access across firms or over time (Beck and Dermirguc-Kunt, 2006;Beck et al, 2008;Campello and Larrain, 2016;de la Torre et al, 2017). In addition, we are interested in size Chapter 2 -Data and Methodology because there is evidence that, due to large fixed costs, only large firms have access to international markets (Pagano et al, 2002;Claessens and Schmukler, 2007).…”

Smart Development Banks

“…The problems associated with the presence of asymmetric information are often amplified by the presence of weak contract enforcement and poor creditors' rights. In fact, weak enforcement can lead to moral hazard even when there are no informational asymmetries (de la Torre et al, 2007).…”