Innovation subsidy under duopoly

Nie, Pu‐yan; Xiao, Xu; Wang, Chan; Cui, Ting

doi:10.1002/mde.3105

Cited by 20 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…Likewise, Nie et al ( 2020 ) also tried to investigate the subsidized innovation efficiency under the prism of game theory. They found the U-shaped relationship between subsidized firms' innovations and product sustainability.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do Chinese enterprises make imitative innovation?—An empirical explanation based on government subsidies

Song

Zhao

2022

Front. Psychol.

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The previous literature analyzed the widespread imitative innovation of Chinese enterprises from various perspectives, including enterprises' rational choice of cost-gain, property rights system, human capital and policy environment. However, this paper provides a brand-new perspective on government subsidies for the reasons behind the imitative innovation of enterprises. According to the statistics from Chinese enterprise-labor matching, we found that government subsidies stimulated enterprises to make “imitative innovation” through patent purchase rather than independent R&D. Government subsidies were used for low-risk “imitative innovation” because of enterprises' rent-seeking behavior, low R&D ability and the review of government subsidy projects. Based on the above conclusions, this paper suggests that the government should reduce or withdraw its intervention in enterprise innovation and implement the post-subsidy and post-evaluation mechanism for government-subsidized programs.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do Chinese enterprises make imitative innovation?—An empirical explanation based on government subsidies

Song

Zhao

2022

Front. Psychol.

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“…Edelman et al [13] point out that sellers who issue discount coupons can attract more new consumers. Nie et al [14] prove the importance of innovation subsidies for innovative enterprises. In the environmental sector, incentives can be used to ensure that sustainability goals are met.…”

Section: Subsidy and Punishment Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…e government is a nonprofit organization whose objective is to maximize social welfare. Based on the literature [6,14,45], we define social welfare as the sum of penalty income, consumer surplus, and enterprise revenue minus the subsidy cost. e expected profit of enterprises is equal to their revenue minus fines and total costs.…”

Section: Problem Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

Yang²

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

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“…developed a theoretical framework and illustrated that the efficiency of agricultural subsidy is significantly influenced by uncertainties (output, costs, and price) and technology conversion efficiency. The subsidizing way was found to affect the innovative behavior and economic profits of enterprises in a duopoly study, and bilateral subsidy is more effective than unilateral subsidy (Nie et al, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Behavior and Influence Mechanisms of Enterprises Using Government Subsidies: Evidence From China

Yan

Huang

2021

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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This study investigates the effects of different subsidy use patterns on economic performance, the effect mechanisms, and differences among enterprises with heterogeneous economic performance. A theoretical model is built to analyze the factors influencing subsidy use. Applying ordinary least squares and panel quantile regressions on panel data of China’s 3,565 A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, we find that subsidies can significantly improve economic performance. Specifically, enterprises usually use subsidies in three different ways (i.e. R&D input, expansion of production capacity for existing products, and human resource training), and the positive impact of these three use patterns on economic performance is moderated by two factors (i.e. the proportions of both R&D operating expenses and human resource training cost) in different degrees. Moreover, the effects are more significant in the lower quantile of economic performance; hence, heterogeneity of economic performance must be considered when formulating relevant policies.

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Innovation subsidy under duopoly

Cited by 20 publications

References 37 publications

Why do Chinese enterprises make imitative innovation?—An empirical explanation based on government subsidies

Why do Chinese enterprises make imitative innovation?—An empirical explanation based on government subsidies

Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

Behavior and Influence Mechanisms of Enterprises Using Government Subsidies: Evidence From China

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