Innovation information sharing between two competitive supply chains

Xu, Honggang; Xiao-min, Liu; Huang, He; Zhou, Yu; Wei, Ying

doi:10.1111/itor.13016

Cited by 27 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(81 reference statements)

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“…(2020), and Xu et al. (2022) are other papers that use this definition of “information‐sharing.” However, in Jing and Xie (2011) and our research, “information‐sharing” represents the behavior in which the informed buyer (or the seller) uses some methods (i.e., online live stream) to share the product information to uninformed buyers. Thus, similar to Jing and Xie (2011), we suppose that there is no incomplete information game in our research.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Information is shared through the game process. , Cai et al (2020), andXu et al (2022) are other papers that use this definition of "information-sharing." However, in Jing and Xie (2011) and our research, "information-sharing" represents the behavior in which the informed buyer (or the seller) uses some methods (i.e., online live stream) to share the product information to uninformed buyers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal group‐buying price strategy considering the information‐sharing of the seller and buyers in social e‐commerce

Guan

Chen

et al. 2021

Int Trans Operational Res

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As one of the most popular forms of social e-commerce, group-buying price (GBP) is a widely used pricing mechanism. One typical example is PinDuoDuo, which was listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange in 2018. On the PinDuoDuo app, sellers generally encourage informed buyers to share information about products with uninformed buyers to increase sales volume. However, a growing number of sellers have begun using new methods (e.g., online live streaming) to share information with buyers themselves. In this article, we investigate optimal pricing decisions under various scenarios of product information-sharing between sellers and buyers. We first investigate a scenario in which either the seller or the informed buyer alone shares information with the uninformed buyer. We then consider a scenario in which they share information together. Further, we extend our model to the situation that the unit cost of information-sharing is nonlinear. We find that the seller will choose to share information herself when the cost of information-sharing is small or the cost function is quadratic, whereas the seller will not always choose to act first when both the seller and the informed buyer share information. GBP strategy is preferred by the seller when the information gap between buyers is in a middle range. These results can help guide sellers in choosing efficient information-sharing methods in social e-commerce.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal group‐buying price strategy considering the information‐sharing of the seller and buyers in social e‐commerce

Guan

Chen

et al. 2021

Int Trans Operational Res

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“…Differs with these above papers, we analyze the impacts of different disclosure strategies (i.e., disclosing by an individual retailer and disclosing by both retailers) on the supply chain performance. Related studies can be obtained in Garefalakis et al (2018), Choi et al (2020) and Xu et al (2022).…”

Section: Information Disclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

Retailers' information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing in competitive supply chains

Wang

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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In this paper, we investigate information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing (BBP) of retailers in a competitive channel with consumers' valuation uncertainty. We analyze the impacts of disclosure strategies (i.e., disclosing by an individual retailer and disclosing by both retailers) with BBP on the pricing decisions and profits of supply chain members. Then, we investigate the effects of the probability of a high valuation on supply chain members. We find that (i) the profits of manufacturers and retailers with BBP and information disclosure are always higher than those with BBP; (ii) the profits of manufacturers and retailers when both retailers implement BBP and use information disclosure are always higher than those when one retailer implements BBP and uses information disclosure; and (iii) the profits of manufacturers and retailers decrease with the probability of a high valuation first and then increase with it when both retailers implement BBP and use information disclosure.

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“…Besides the abovementioned papers, many other works investigate this area to allow more features such as customer rebate and retailer incentive promotions [16], contract choice game [17], contract design [18,19], supply uncertainty [20], Green and sustainable supply chains [21][22][23], manufacturer rebate [24], strategic inventory [25], and information sharing strategies [26]. Our paper difers from the abovementioned research studies from that we consider capital-constrained retailers and investigate the impact of such feature on each member's decision as well as the chainto-chain competition.…”

Section: Operational and Marketing Decisions Under Chain-to-chain Com...mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Bank Financing under Supply Chain-to-Chain Competition

Liang

2022

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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We consider two supply chains, each consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The two retailers are involved in Cournot competition and purchase one single product only from the supplier in the same supply chain. The two suppliers are heterogenous in the production cost. In addition, both retailers are in short of capital, hence both of them need to raise bank loans. All players are risk neutral and their objectives are to maximize their own profit. Based on these features, we establish an analytical model and characterize each player’s optimal decision. Compared to the benchmark model when both retailers have sufficient capital, we find that, in optimal, each supplier provides a lower wholesale price to its own retailer. Moreover, when one of the supplier’s cost is small enough, the corresponding supply chain’s competitive advantage is amplified by the financial cost (i.e., loan interest), generating a larger selling quantity to the market. Therefore, the supply chain achieves a higher profit than the benchmark case, while the other supply chain is worse off. However, if the difference of the two suppliers’ costs is not that significant, all players in the two supply chains would be worse off. Moreover, the numerical experiment further shows that when each supplier’s cost is low enough, both retailers can be better off even if they are capital-constrained. Our results provide useful insights into the supply chain competition when retailers use bank loans to finance their operations.

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Innovation information sharing between two competitive supply chains

Cited by 27 publications

References 46 publications

Optimal group‐buying price strategy considering the information‐sharing of the seller and buyers in social e‐commerce

Optimal group‐buying price strategy considering the information‐sharing of the seller and buyers in social e‐commerce

Retailers' information disclosure strategies with behavior‐based pricing in competitive supply chains

The Effect of Bank Financing under Supply Chain-to-Chain Competition

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