Inner speech sustains predictable task switching: direct evidence in adults

Laurent, Lucie; Millot, Jean-Louis; Andrieu, Patrice; Camos, Valérie; Floccia, Caroline; Mathy, Fabien

doi:10.1080/20445911.2016.1164173

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The cognitive functions (or rather uses) of inner speech have been investigated by means of introspective questionnaires and behavioral methods, in typical and atypical populations (for reviews, see e.g., Perrone-Bertolotti et al, 2014; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015; Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, 2015; Alderson-Day et al, 2018; and the volume edited by Langland-Hassan and Vicente, 2018). Previous works suggest that inner speech plays an important role in many cognitive operations, including working memory (Baddeley, 1992; Marvel and Desmond, 2012), autobiographical and prospective memory (Meacham, 1979; Conway, 2005; Morin and Hamper, 2012; Pavlenko, 2014), orientation and spatial reasoning (Loewenstein and Gentner, 2005), mental arithmetics (Sokolov, 1972), executive control (Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Laurent et al, 2016), complex problem solving (Sokolov, 1972; Baldo et al, 2005, 2015), and theory of mind judgment (Newton and de Villiers, 2007). It has also been considered that inner speech serves metacognitive functions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Inner speech has been shown to vary in form along several dimensions. Along condensation, condensed inner speech forms have been described, that are supposed to be deprived of acoustic, phonological and even syntactic qualities. Expanded forms, on the other extreme, display articulatory and auditory properties. Along dialogality, inner speech can be monologal, when we engage in internal soliloquy, or dialogal, when we recall past conversations or imagine future dialogs involving our own voice as well as that of others addressing us. Along intentionality, it can be intentional (when we deliberately rehearse material in short-term memory) or it can arise unintentionally (during mind wandering). We introduce the ConDialInt model, a neurocognitive predictive control model of inner speech that accounts for its varieties along these three dimensions. ConDialInt spells out the condensation dimension by including inhibitory control at the conceptualization, formulation or articulatory planning stage. It accounts for dialogality, by assuming internal model adaptations and by speculating on neural processes underlying perspective switching. It explains the differences between intentional and spontaneous varieties in terms of monitoring. We present an fMRI study in which we probed varieties of inner speech along dialogality and intentionality, to examine the validity of the neuroanatomical correlates posited in ConDialInt. Condensation was also informally tackled. Our data support the hypothesis that expanded inner speech recruits speech production processes down to articulatory planning, resulting in a predicted signal, the inner voice, with auditory qualities. Along dialogality, covertly using an avatar’s voice resulted in the activation of right hemisphere homologs of the regions involved in internal own-voice soliloquy and in reduced cerebellar activation, consistent with internal model adaptation. Switching from first-person to third-person perspective resulted in activations in precuneus and parietal lobules. Along intentionality, compared with intentional inner speech, mind wandering with inner speech episodes was associated with greater bilateral inferior frontal activation and decreased activation in left temporal regions. This is consistent with the reported subjective evanescence and presumably reflects condensation processes. Our results provide neuroanatomical evidence compatible with predictive control and in favor of the assumptions made in the ConDialInt model.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework

et al. 2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…One reason why inner speech frequency has not been extensively researched may lies in the common belief that it cannot be easily observed, although there are methods such as the surface electromyography technique that have been developed to detect inner speech production (e.g., Garrity, 1977; Betts et al, 2006; Laurent et al, 2016). Existing research attempting to investigate inner speech frequency mainly relies on self-report methods such as versions of the experience sampling method and questionnaires (cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual Differences in Frequency of Inner Speech: Differential Relations with Cognitive and Non-cognitive Factors

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Inner speech plays a crucial role in behavioral regulation and the use of inner speech is very common among adults. However, less is known about individual differences in the frequency of inner speech use and about the underlying processes that may explain why people exhibit individual differences in the frequency of inner speech use. This study was conducted to investigate how individual differences in the frequency of inner speech use are related to cognitive and non-cognitive factors. Four functions of inner speech including self-criticism, self-reinforcement, self-management, and social assessment measured by an adapted version of Brinthaupt's Self-Talk Scale were examined. The cognitive factors that were considered included executive functioning and complex reasoning and the non-cognitive factors consisted of trait anxiety and impulsivity. Data were collected from a large Chinese sample. Results revealed that anxiety and impulsivity were mainly related to the frequency of the affective function of inner speech (self-criticism and self-reinforcement) and executive functions and complex reasoning were mainly related to the frequency of the cognitive, self-regulatory function of inner speech (self-management).

show abstract

“…In a similar vein, switching costs have shown to increase in adults when inner speech is disrupted, e.g., via articulatory suppression (Emerson and Miyake, 2003;Miyake et al, 2004). Recently, a role for inner speech in task switching has also been shown in an interference-free setting, via electromyographic recordings from the tongue (Laurent et al, 2016). Yet, it is not only flexibility that is affected by overt or coverts verbalization but also other aspects of control tasks such as inhibition (Kray et al, 2009), task maintenance (Saeki et al, 2013), and control focus (proactive vs. reactive control; Kray et al, 2015) have been shown to be modified by task-related verbalizations.…”

Section: The Use Of Inner Speech In Support Of Cognitive Controlmentioning

confidence: 93%

How Abstract (Non-embodied) Linguistic Representations Augment Cognitive Control

Kompa

Mueller

2020

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is claimed, is a cognition-enhancing niche (Clark, 2006), a programming tool for cognition (Lupyan and Bergen, 2016), even neuroenhancement (Dove, 2019) and augments cognitive functions such as memory, categorization, cognitive control, and meta-cognitive abilities ("thinking about thinking"). Yet, the notion that language enhances or augments cognition, and in particular, cognitive control does not easily fit in with embodied approaches to language processing, or so we will argue. Accounts aiming to explain how language enhances various cognitive functions often employ a notion of abstract representation. Yet, embodied approaches to language processing have it that language processing crucially, according to some accounts even exclusively, involves embodied, modalityspecific, i.e., non-abstract representations. In coming to understand a particular phrase or sentence, a prior experience has to be simulated or reenacted. The representation thus activated is embodied (modality-specific) as sensorimotor regions of the brain are thereby recruited. In this paper, we will first discuss the notion of representation, clarify what it takes for a representation to be embodied or abstract, and distinguish between conceptual and (other) linguistic representations. We will then put forward a characterization of cognitive control and examine its representational infrastructure. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that language augments cognitive control. To that end, we will draw on two lines of research, which investigate how language augments cognitive control: (i) research on the availability of linguistic labels and (ii) research on the active usage of a linguistic code, specifically, in inner speech. Eventually, we will argue that the cognition-enhancing capacity of language can be explained once we assume that it provides us with (a) abstract, non-embodied representations and with (b) abstract, sparse linguistic representations that may serve as easy-to-manipulate placeholders for fully embodied or otherwise more detailed representations.

show abstract

Inner speech sustains predictable task switching: direct evidence in adults

Cited by 10 publications

References 26 publications

The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework

The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework

Individual Differences in Frequency of Inner Speech: Differential Relations with Cognitive and Non-cognitive Factors

How Abstract (Non-embodied) Linguistic Representations Augment Cognitive Control

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About