Inner conflict: How smart device components can cause harm

Shwartz, Omer; Cohen, Avraham; Shabtai, Asaf; Oren, Yossi

doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.101665

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 9 publications

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“…Side-Channel Analysis. System-level delay side-channel information (such as based on JTAG [28], I2C [46]), power side-channel information [42], or combined multiparameter side-channel analysis [19] can be utilized to perform anomaly detection and run-time monitoring. Although, power and delay side-channel leakage are fundamentally caused by the PDN of target devices, their analysis is usually limited to specific anomaly types and offers only partial PCB area coverage.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

PDNPulse: Sensing PCB Anomaly with the Intrinsic Power Delivery Network

Zhu¹,

Shan²,

Sullivan³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The ubiquitous presence of printed circuit boards (PCBs) in modern electronic systems and embedded devices makes their integrity a top security concern. To take advantage of the economies of scale, today's PCB design and manufacturing are often performed by suppliers around the globe, exposing them to many security vulnerabilities along the segmented PCB supply chain. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the PCB designs also leaves ample room for numerous sneaky board-level attacks to be implemented throughout each stage of a PCB's lifetime, threatening many electronic devices. In this paper, we propose PDNPulse, a power delivery network (PDN) based PCB anomaly detection framework that can identify a wide spectrum of boardlevel malicious modifications. PDNPulse leverages the fact that the PDN's characteristics are inevitably affected by modifications to the PCB, no matter how minuscule. By detecting changes to the PDN impedance profile and using the Frechet distancebased anomaly detection algorithms, PDNPulse can robustly and successfully discern malicious modifications across the system. Using PDNPulse, we conduct extensive experiments on seven commercial-off-the-shelf PCBs, covering different design scales, different threat models, and seven different anomaly types. The results confirm that PDNPulse creates an effective security asymmetry between attack and defense.

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