Infusion of the Common Law into the Legal System of Israel

Friedmann, Daniel

doi:10.1017/s0021223700005306

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This is understandable, because bailouts are typically given to organizations whose failure would bring deep and broad economic repercussions (Stark and Bruszt, 1998), and there are probably only two coops (Egged and Dan) that ever met this criterion. There was effectively no antitrust law during the Mandate (Friedman, 1975). While Israel does enforce antitrust legislation, variations of antitrust law would have a limited impact on the coops, because collusion is antithetical to their cooperative ideology (Daniel, 1976).…”

Section: Political Order and Organizational Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' Cooperatives, 1920–1992

Ingram

Simons

2000

Administrative Science Quarterly

112

126

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University, and at the Conference on Institutions and Markets inComparative-Historical Perspective at Stanford University, as well as Don Palmer, Linda Johanson, and three anonymous ASQ reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Rusty Russell generously made public the data he collected on Israeli workers' cooperatives, and Yael Parag was very helpful in supplementing the data for our purposes.We investigate the effect of community-wide political and ideological interests on the failure rate of Israeli workers' cooperatives. Political order may be provided by the state or through membership in a federation. Independently, both conditions should reduce organizational failure, but when they coexist, the influence of the state should dominate due to its comparative advantages as a supplier of order. Organizations that represent rival ideologies cause ideological competition, which should increase failure, while organizations that represent shared ideologies cause ideological mutualism, which should decrease failure. The context of Israeli workers' cooperatives provides a natural laboratory for testing these ideas, as it spans the formation of the Israeli state. It also includes a powerful federation, the Histadrut, to which many cooperatives belonged, as well as significant populations of organizations representing both capitalist and socialist ideologies. The analysis supports all of the above arguments, indicating the relevance of interdependence, broadly defined, for the evolution of organizational populations.0 Interdependence between organizational populations is an understudied topic (Astley, 1985; Baum, 1996; Hunt and Aldrich, 1998). What research there is has tended to focus on economic and technological interdependencies (e.g., Barnett, 1990;Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992;Hunt and Aldrich, 1998), to the exclusion of political and ideological ones (Carroll, Delacroix, and Goodstein, 1990). Yet both political structures and ideologies can have dramatic effects on organizational outcomes. These effects are illustrated throughout history, for example, by the marked economic improvements that accompanied the reordering of power between the Parliament and the king in England's Glorious Revolution of 1689. Those changes have been attributed both to efforts to build a more economically effective structure of state power (North and Weingast, 1989) and to religious rivalry (Carruthers, 1990). Contemporary illustrations are also available, such as the differences in organizational behavior and performance that result from changes in and variance among political and ideological regimes in the transitioning economies of Eastern Europe (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). We will use "coops" here to refer to Israeli workers' cooperatives, and "cooperatives" to refer to other cooperative organizations.

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Section: Political Order and Organizational Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' Cooperatives, 1920–1992

Ingram

Simons

2000

Administrative Science Quarterly

112

126

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Another possible concern relates to the degree of transferability of the study, which examined Israeli CCs. The Israeli criminal justice system is similar to most Anglo-American ones in that it is adversarial, managerial, and overburdened (Friedmann 1975). Like some Western countries and unlike the United States, Israeli citizens enjoy comprehensive public health and social welfare systems, which provide subsidized social, mental, and physical health services to all.…”

Section: Discussion: Translating Many Shades Of Success Into Bottom-u...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Many Shades of Success: Bottom-up Indicators of Individual Success in Community Courts

Dancig-Rosenberg,

Gal

2023

Law Soc. Inq.

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This study challenges the conventional approach to the appropriate indicators of individual success in community courts (CCs) by exploring the different meanings that CC professionals ascribe to the term “success.” CCs conduct a non-adversarial process in which team members collaborate to provide a comprehensive rehabilitative intervention for recidivist participants. We conducted fifty-three in-depth interviews with CC personnel between 2016 and 2020. According to the interviewees, standard evaluation measures such as program completion, reduced recidivism, and systemic reduction of incarceration are necessary for evaluating these courts. Yet individual success is relative, subjective, multidimensional, and must be understood as a continuum. Therefore, it should also be measured by looking at significant processes of change that participants have undergone in various aspects of their lives. Study findings can be translated into measurable well-being indicators, moving the “what works” discourse forward to include more nuanced and diverse manifestations of success in studies evaluating specialized courts.

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“…Most scholars acknowledge that the Israeli legal system has many legal institutions tracing their roots to the Ottoman Rule and the British Mandate. During the 30 years of the British Mandate over Palestine , the local legal system underwent an extensive process of anglicization (Fridmann, 1975).…”

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confidence: 99%

Role of government’s legal adviser in curbing corruption in Israel

Primakov¹

2019

JFC

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Purpose The status of government’s legal adviser in Israel is complicated and controversial. This status deeply impacts discretion and independence, especially in the role of combating corruption. This article aims to review the status, power and independence of the government’s legal adviser and his/her interaction with other legal institutions dealing with corruption cases. Design/methodology/approach The author argues that the period of the 1980s, in Israel, was characterized by prosecution’s activism because of the dramatically increased number of corruption-related cases. Findings Prominent government legal advisers formulated approaches to the struggle against political corruption in Israel; upon becoming justices of the supreme court, they successfully transited their prosecution mindset to judicial activism (and not only for corruption-related cases). Originality/value This article discovers a linkage between prosecution and judicial positions, not under the Israeli legislation but based on personal willingness to combat corruption.

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Infusion of the Common Law into the Legal System of Israel

Cited by 12 publications

References 15 publications

State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' Cooperatives, 1920–1992

State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' Cooperatives, 1920–1992

Many Shades of Success: Bottom-up Indicators of Individual Success in Community Courts

Role of government’s legal adviser in curbing corruption in Israel

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