Infrastructure security games

Baykal‐Gürsoy, Melike; Duan, Zhe; Poor, H. Vincent; Garnaev, Andrey

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.04.033

Cited by 56 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Another technique used to address lack of information problems is state estimation. For example, [31] used a Kalman filter to estimate the state of an observable, linear, stochastic dynamic system in an infrastructure security game. Since, our system of interest is nonlinear and may not be completely-observable, applicability of these techniques is also very limited.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jammer-Type Estimation in LTE With a Smart Jammer Repeated Game

Aziz

Shamma

Stuber

2017

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

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Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jammer-Type Estimation in LTE With a Smart Jammer Repeated Game

Aziz

Shamma

Stuber

2017

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

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“…taking account of the total attrition on the way to the destination and Equation (4). E l is a set of arcs on the path l and E e l is a set of arcs from the start node through an arc e along the path l. From the derivation, we calculate the expectation of the game value by a defender mixed strategy g(s) and further by a mixed strategy of the h-type attacker, π h , as follows.…”

Section: Formulation and Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While sequentially observing the defender's position, an attacker is going to invade the region and decides to attack or not targets on the nodes he reaches, worrying about an arrest by the defender coming there during attacking the target. In the model of Baykal-Gursoy et al [4], a patrolling defender tries to mitigate the damage an attacker causes to targets placed on several nodes on a network. Garnaev et al [10] considered the same security game on a network but modeled the problem by a Bayesian game assuming two types of attackers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Among papers cited above, the followings consider networks as security spaces to make the models realistic: [35], [11], [12], [3], [4], [10], [34], [5], [30], [1], [2], [40], [27], [17], [9], [37], [23], [43], [8], [39], [21], [15], [16] and [18]. Among these researches, just [15], [16] and [18] explicitly take account of attrition on players, which would occur through the conflict between attackers and defenders.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Games Taking Account of Invasion Routes and Attrition

Hohzaki

Sakai

2017

JORSJ

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This paper deals with security games which would be found around our lives. In a facility represented by a network, several types of invaders/attackers conflict with security guards/defenders who have also several security teams. The attacker chooses an invasion path to move along. He incurs some attrition by the conflict on arcs but surviving attackers give damage to the facility on his invasion route while the defender tries to minimize the damage by intercepting the attacker by a limited number of guards. The defender takes a randomized plan with respect to the adoption of each security team and the deployment of guards. Since the attacker know the defender's randomized plan before his decision making, the security problem is modeled by a Stackelberg game with the superiority of the attacker on information acquisition to the defender. There has been no research on the security game with multiple types of players modeled on a network, which explicitly takes account attrition on players. By some numerical examples, we investigate the best configuration of staff numbers in security teams and some characteristics of optimal defense to mitigate the damage caused by the attackers.

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“…Salmeron et al [43,44] considered a defense game of an electric power grid involving mitigating the damage inflicted by terrorist attacks. Baykal-Gürsoy et al [8] considered a mitigation policy of node investigations and active patrols after an attacker has damaged nodes on a network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of a Player's Awareness of Information Acquisition and Ability to Change Strategy in Attrition Games

Hohzaki

Tanaka

2017

JORSJ

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This paper deals with a two-person zero-sum (TPZS) attrition game on a network in which attackers depart from a start node and attempt to reach a destination node while defenders deploy to intercept the attackers. Both players incur some attrition due to conflict between them, but the payoff of the game is the number of surviving attackers reaching the destination. We generate a system of models categorized according to various scenarios of the player's information acquisition (IA) about his opponent and derive linear programming formulations for the equilibria of the models. Comparing the equilibria, we evaluate the values of the situations around the IA in a comprehensive manner.

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Infrastructure security games

Cited by 56 publications

References 59 publications

Jammer-Type Estimation in LTE With a Smart Jammer Repeated Game

Jammer-Type Estimation in LTE With a Smart Jammer Repeated Game

Security Games Taking Account of Invasion Routes and Attrition

Effects of a Player's Awareness of Information Acquisition and Ability to Change Strategy in Attrition Games

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