1998
DOI: 10.1016/s0305-750x(98)00054-0
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Infrastructure project finance and capital flows: A new perspective

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Cited by 80 publications
(58 citation statements)
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References 19 publications
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“…Empirical work that has, to date, primarily adopted a case study approach provides strong support for this hypothesis (Grandy, 1989;Daniels and Trebilcock, 1994;Crain and Oakley, 1995;Levy and Spiller, 1996 ;Ramamurti, 1996;Savedoff and Spiller, 1997;Dailami and Leipziger, 1998) including two examples delving into economic history by examining the construction of the Spanish (Keefer, 1996) and New Jersey (Grandy, 1989) railways. Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications and electricity have also found strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita infrastructure investment.…”
Section: Political Institutions and Investmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical work that has, to date, primarily adopted a case study approach provides strong support for this hypothesis (Grandy, 1989;Daniels and Trebilcock, 1994;Crain and Oakley, 1995;Levy and Spiller, 1996 ;Ramamurti, 1996;Savedoff and Spiller, 1997;Dailami and Leipziger, 1998) including two examples delving into economic history by examining the construction of the Spanish (Keefer, 1996) and New Jersey (Grandy, 1989) railways. Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications and electricity have also found strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita infrastructure investment.…”
Section: Political Institutions and Investmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…mitigation of political risk), and therein deviated somewhat from the strong finance perspective observed in previous research. Shortly after, Dailami and Leipziger (1997) provided the first major empirical attempt to test formal models in a quantitative study of credit spreads. Using infrastructure projects, they found that host-country environmental factors strongly affect credit risk and pricing.…”
Section: Financial Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Its structure is tailored to the socio-economic environment in which the investment is made. Related research has shown that the pricing of loans (Dailami and Leipziger 1997) and the composition of lending syndicates differ as a function of the institutional environment (Esty and Megginson 2003). Furthermore, it has found that the choice of PF as a particular governance structure is directly related to the legal protection of investors (Subramanian and Tung 2016).…”
Section: Interdisciplinary Perspectivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, the fixed phone network in USA, the current UK railroad infrastructures, and the nineteenth century Dutch railroad network was financed, built, owned, and operated by the private sector. The reasons range from low performance of state-owned utilities [38], budgetary vulnerability [36], the low efficacy of public finance [13], and the proven private sector efficiency [35]. In general, governments tend more and more to contract infrastructure development activities to the private sector, reducing uncertainty and risks of long pay-back periods that are inherent to infrastructure investments.…”
Section: Infrastructure Development: a Comparison With Classical Infrmentioning
confidence: 99%