“…Empirical work that has, to date, primarily adopted a case study approach provides strong support for this hypothesis (Grandy, 1989;Daniels and Trebilcock, 1994;Crain and Oakley, 1995;Levy and Spiller, 1996 ;Ramamurti, 1996;Savedoff and Spiller, 1997;Dailami and Leipziger, 1998) including two examples delving into economic history by examining the construction of the Spanish (Keefer, 1996) and New Jersey (Grandy, 1989) railways. Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications and electricity have also found strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita infrastructure investment.…”