Information: The Algorithmic Paradigm

This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3.The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably. Abstract. This paper deals with the question: what are the key requirements for a physical system to perform digital computation? Oftentimes, cognitive scientists are quick to employ the notion of computation simpliciter when asserting basically that cognitive activities are computational. They employ this notion as if there is a consensus on just what it takes for a physical system to compute. Some cognitive scientists in referring to digital computation simply adhere to Turing computability. But if cognition is indeed computational, then it is concrete computation that is required for explaining cognition as an embodied phenomenon. Three accounts of computation are examined here: 1. Formal Symbol Manipulation. 2. Physical Symbol Systems and 3. The Mechanistic account. I argue that the differing requirements implied by these accounts justify the demand that one commits to a particular account when employing the notion of digital computation in regard to physical systems, rather than use these accounts interchangeably.

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A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology

Fresco

Staines

2013

Minds & Machines

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A revised attack on computational ontology A revised attack on computational ontology Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies Commons Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Fresco, Nir and Staines, Phillip J., "A revised attack on computational ontology" (2014). Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences -Papers: Part A. 2075. https://ro.uow.edu.au/eispapers/2075 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au A revised attack on computational ontology A revised attack on computational ontology Abstract AbstractThere has been an ongoing conflict regarding whether reality is fundamentally digital or analogue.Recently, Floridi has argued that this dichotomy is misapplied. For any attempt to analyse noumenal reality independently of any level of abstraction at which the analysis is conducted is mistaken. In the pars destruens of this paper, we argue that Floridi does not establish that it is only levels of abstraction that are analogue or digital, rather than noumenal reality. In the pars construens of this paper, we reject a classification of noumenal reality as a deterministic discrete computational system. We show, based on considerations from classical physics, why a deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems (e.g., a reversible computational universe cannot be strictly deterministic).Abstract. There has been an ongoing conflict regarding whether reality is fundamentally digital or analogue. Recently, Floridi has argued that this dichotomy is misapplied. For any attempt to analyse noumenal reality independently of any level of abstraction at which the analysis is conducted is mistaken. In the pars destruens of this paper, we argue that Floridi does not establish that it is only levels of abstraction that are analogue or digital, rather than noumenal reality. In the pars construens of this paper, we reject a classification of noumenal reality as a deterministic discrete computational system. We show, based on considerations from classical physics, why a deterministic computational view of the universe faces problems (e.g., a reversible computational universe cannot be strictly deterministic).

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Information: The Algorithmic Paradigm

Cited by 3 publications

References 24 publications

Computation as Information Processing

Computation as Information Processing

A Critical Survey of Some Competing Accounts of Concrete Digital Computation

A Revised Attack on Computational Ontology

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