Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Kopel, Michael; Putz, Eva Maria

doi:10.1002/mde.3348

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 40 publications

(63 reference statements)

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“…While the timing of observation plays a vital role in product market competition because the weights are commitment devices used to decide strategic variables in a product market, Hamamura (2021a) only considers whether firms should disclose their weight placed on the rivals' profits. While several studies focus on social welfare with delegation games (e.g., Baik & Lee, 2020; Kopel & Putz, 2021a, 2021b), only a few explore the disclosure regulation of a performance evaluation system based on a delegation game with the RPE.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs

Hamamura,

Ramani

2024

Scottish J Political Eco

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We examine the welfare effects of the endogenous decision and release timing of weight placed on the rival's profits under relative performance evaluation with quantity competition and asymmetric marginal costs. We find that when the advantaged firm decides and releases the weight as the leader, it always chooses a negative weight on relative performance evaluation, whereas the disadvantaged firm may choose a positive or negative weight depending on the degree of product substitution. Furthermore, we demonstrate that while all firms prefer to release weights early, this situation does not improve social welfare in several economic environments.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…While several studies focus on social welfare with delegation games (e.g., Baik & Lee, 2020;Kopel & Putz, 2021a, 2021b, only a few explore the disclosure regulation of a performance evaluation system based on a delegation game with the RPE. 11…”

Section: Rel Ated Liter Aturementioning

confidence: 99%

The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs

Hamamura,

Ramani

2024

Scottish J Political Eco

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“…Many factors affect the transfer and commercialization of technologies, such as competition mode (Li and Ji, 2010;Nguyen et al, 2014;Zhao et al, 2022); product differentiation (Nguyen et al, 2014(Nguyen et al, , 2017Bakaouka and Milliou, 2018), imitation costs (Kogan et al, 2013), type of innovation (Agrawal et al, 2016;Chen and Xie, 2018), bargaining power of two parties (Kishimoto, 2020), and network effect (Lin and Kulatilaka, 2006;Zhang et al, 2018). In addition, mixed competition has different influences on market equilibrium as well as on social welfare compared with those under symmetric competition strategies (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2019;Lee et al, 2020;Askar, 2021;Kopel and Putz, 2021). In practice, the Cournot-Bertrand behavior is prevalent in various markets (Tremblay and Tremblay, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Zhang

Zhou

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Technology licensing as a vital part of business behavior in many industries has drawn a fair amount of attention in industrial organization literature. Most existing literature on licensing decisions assumes that all firms engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition, while the type of mixed competition may affect the choice of the licensor. In this context, what decision will the licensor make faced with different mixed competitions? This paper studies the optimal technology licensing contract of a licensor firm engaging in different mixed competitions (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) with a potential licensee in a differentiated duopoly market considering one upstream firm (supplier) that provides key inputs. We find that if either the royalty or fixed-fee licensing is applied, the licensor favors royalty licensing under Bertrand-Cournot competition when the degree of substitution is small and prefers the fixed-fee licensing no matter under what kind of mixed competition as the degree of substitution increases. In the case of fixed-fee licensing, the result shows that the profits of licensors are the same under different types of mixed competition. Besides, fixed-fee licensing is not always the optimal choice for consumers, and they would prefer royalty licensing when the degree of substitution is very small.

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“…37 37 For a study on information sharing in oligopolies with a hybrid Cournot‐Bertrand market structure, see Kopel and Putz (2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

Measuring the effects of information exchange on incentives to collude using calibrated simulations (with an example of the South African oil industry)

Bageri

Katsoulacos

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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Information sharing may help firms solve the coordination and monitoring problems that threaten the sustainability of concerted practices or tacit collusion. This paper models the impact of information sharing on the incentives of firms in an oligopolistic market to sustain a concerted practice, taking into account recent theoretical developments and empirical evidence on tacit collusion. We then calibrate and simulate the effect of information sharing, mediated by the industry association, on each firm in the South African oil industry. Our analysis offers a rigorous, but also practical, framework for facilitating Competition Authorities' decision making in investigations of information sharing.

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Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Cited by 9 publications

References 40 publications

The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs

The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs

Mixed competition and technology licensing in a supply chain

Measuring the effects of information exchange on incentives to collude using calibrated simulations (with an example of the South African oil industry)

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