Information search and evaluative processes in decision making: A computer based process tracing study

Dahlstrand, Ulf; Montgomery, Henry

doi:10.1016/0001-6918(84)90012-x

Cited by 47 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Previous studies of restructuring of choice problems (Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984;Montgomery & Svenson, 1989) have shown that the amount of attention to, and positive evaluation of, an option depends on whether it is finally preferred or not. Therefore, the attention and evaluation indices confined to attribute levels were calculated separately for options which were preferred (either chosen or receiving a higher preference judgement) and non-preferred, respectively (Table 5).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: Cognitive explanations

Selart

Montgomery

Romanus

et al. 1994

European Journal of Cognitive Psychology

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A violation of procedure invariance in preference measurement is that the predominant or prominent attribute looms larger in choice than in a match ing task. In Experiment 1, this so-called prominence effect was demonstrated for choices between pairs of options, choices to accept single options, and preference ratings of single options. That is, in all these response modes the prominent attribute loomed larger than in matching. The results were replicated in Experiment 2, in which subjects chose between or rated their preference for pairs of options which were matched to be equally attractive either in the same session or 1 week earlier. On the basis of these and previous results, it is argued that the prominence effect is a reliable pheno menon. However, none of several cognitive explanations which have been offered appears to be completely viable.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: Cognitive explanations

Selart

Montgomery

Romanus

et al. 1994

European Journal of Cognitive Psychology

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“…Previous studies of restructuring of choice problems (Dahlstrand and Montgomery, 1984;Montgomery and Svenson, 1989) have shown that both amount of attention paid to an option and positive evaluation of an option depend on whether it is finally chosen or not. Therefore, as shown in Exhibit 3, mean judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels were computed both for target options which were Treferred/nonpreferred refers to whether the option was finally chosen or, in the preference-judgment condition whether It received the highest preference judgement.…”

Section: Judgments Of Attractiveness Of Attribute Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

Montgomery¹,

Selart²,

Gärling³

et al. 1994

Behavioral Decision Making

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The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think‐aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think‐aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.

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“…This, they explained, is because individuals desire to maintain a consistency in their beliefs and reduce the effort of making a decision by confirming already setup preferences and rejecting information that goes against the chosen alternative. Using related theoretical perspectives, other researchers have reported similar findings (e.g., Backlund, Skånér, Montgomery, Bring, & Strender, 2003;Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984;Holyoak & Simon, 1999;Kuhl, 1984).…”

Section: Information Processing In Decision Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 53%

“…In his dominance structuring theory, Montgomery (1983) suggested that if Jane cannot find a dominating alternative, she will change the structuring of the alternatives so that one of the alternatives will eventually become dominant. Dahlstrand and Montgomery (1984) found that individuals, in their search for a dominance structure, applied the Lexicographic heuristic explained earlier (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996;Gigerenzer et al, 1999) and the Maximin heuristic, choice of an alternative that has the best worst outcome (Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984). Another heuristic is Tversky's (1972) Elimination by aspects (EBA) heuristic.…”

Section: Heuristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Theories of ideal alternatives, closely related to distance theories, focus on how individual's ideals guide the decision making process (Zakay & Dil, 1984). Heuristics focus on how humans have developed simple rules of thumb in order to cope with the limited cognitive capacity (Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984;Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). In this thesis, I will investigate and compare several decisions strategies and theories against each other.…”

Section: Examples Of Decision Strategies and Related Theories In A Numentioning

confidence: 99%

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Decision Strategies: Something Old, Something New, and Something Borrowed

Kerimi¹

2011

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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In this thesis, some old decision strategies are investigated and a new one that furthers our understanding of how decisions are made is introduced. Three studies are presented. In Study I and II, strategies are investigated in terms of inferences and in Study III, strategies are investigated in terms of preferences. Inferences refer to decisions regarding facts, e.g., whether a patient has a heart disease or not. Preferences refer to decision makers' personal preferences between different choice alternatives, e.g., which flat out of many to choose. In all three studies, both non-compensatory strategies and compensatory strategies were investigated. In compensatory strategies, a high value in one attribute cannot compensate for a low value in another, while in non-compensatory strategies such compensation is possible. Results from Study I showed that both compensatory (logistic regression) and noncompensatory (fast and frugal) strategies make inferences equally well, but logistic regression strategies are more frugal (i.e., use fewer cues) than the fast and frugal strategies. Study II showed that the results were independent of the degree of expertise. The good inferential ability of both noncompensatory and compensatory strategies suggests there might be room for a strategy that can combine the strengths of the two. Study III introduces such a strategy, the Concordant-ranks (CR) strategy. Results from Study III showed that choices and attractiveness evaluations followed this new strategy. This strategy dictates a choice of an alternative with concordant ranks between attribute values and attribute weights when alternatives are about equally attractive. CR also serves as a proxy for finding the alternative with the shortest distance to an ideal. The CR strategy combines the computational simplicity of non-compensatory strategies with the superior information integration ability of compensatory strategies.

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Information search and evaluative processes in decision making: A computer based process tracing study

Cited by 47 publications

References 2 publications

Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: Cognitive explanations

Violations of procedure invariance in preference measurement: Cognitive explanations

The judgment‐choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

Decision Strategies: Something Old, Something New, and Something Borrowed

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