Information revelation in multiattribute English auctions: A laboratory study

Strecker, Stefan

doi:10.1016/j.dss.2010.03.002

Cited by 38 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…When market participants' utilities are quasi-linear, then the efficient transactions, i.e., these that lie on the contract curve of a bid-taker and a bid-maker differ in price value but not in the configuration of attribute values [28]. This may be difficult to accept when the auction is not over goods produced earlier (in which case their costs are fixed) but over goods that are produced only after the auction successfully concludes.…”

Section: A Two Assumptions and Their Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Winners and Losers in Procurement Auctions

Kersten

Wachowicz

2014

Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems

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g o t i a t i o n s . A u c t i o n t h e o r y i s b a s e d o n t w oassumptions which assure that auctions are efficient mechanisms, guarantee efficient solutions, and produce the best possible results for bid-takers. In practice these assumptions are often violated. The contribution of this paper is to propose a procedure for auctions-followed-by negotiations which retains important auction features such as process transparency and efficiency while allowing for increased social welfare. The unique feature of the procedure is the introduction of the winwin phase in which the market participants may attempt to make joint improvements to efficient solutions obtained from auctions.

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Section: A Two Assumptions and Their Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Winners and Losers in Procurement Auctions

Kersten

Wachowicz

2014

Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems

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“…A comparison between auctions and negotiations based on multiattributes besides price has not yet been undertaken (except for [9]), although there have been some studies conducted to compare multi-attribute auctions under different information revelations (e.g., [4,5,10,16,23,38]). …”

Section: Research Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

NegotiAuction: An experimental study

Pham

Зайцев

Steiner

et al. 2013

Decision Support Systems

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“…This enables competitive bidding with heterogeneous, but substitutable offers. In addition to game theoretical models (Che 1993;Brandt 2003), several implementations have been proposed and tested experimentally in the past few years (Bichler et al 1999;Bichler 2000;Bichler and Klimesch 2000;Strecker 2003). Multi-attribute auctions differ in the types of scoring rules or functions used, and in the type of feedback that is provided to bidders.…”

Section: Other Types Of Multidimensional Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions

Bichler

Pikovsky

Setzer

2009

Bus. Inf. Syst. Eng.

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This paper, selected for the category "Best papers from 1959 to 2008", was first published in WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK 47(2)2005:126-134. Combinatorial auctions are promising auction formats for industrial and public procurement. Potential advantages of using combinatorial auctions include lower overall spend, low transaction costs for multi-item negotiations, fairness and market transparency for suppliers as well as high allocative efficiency. A number of fundamental design considerations are relevant to the application of combinatorial auctions in procurement. In addition, procurement specialists need to consider several domain-specific requirements, such as additional side constraints as well as alternative multidimensional bid types.

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Information revelation in multiattribute English auctions: A laboratory study

Cited by 38 publications

References 16 publications

On Winners and Losers in Procurement Auctions

On Winners and Losers in Procurement Auctions

NegotiAuction: An experimental study

An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions

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